Nordic or North Atlantic alliance?: the postwar Scandinavian security debate by Skodvin, Magne
Forsvarsstudier 3/1990 
Nordic or North 
Atlantic AUiance? 
Tlhe !Postwar Scandinavian Security Debate 
Magne Slwdvin 
Instilult for forsvarsstudier (IFS) Tollbugt. 10, 0152 Oslo I, Norge 
INSTITUTI FOR FORSVARSSTUDIER- IFS- (tidligere Forsvarshistorisk 
forskningssenter) er en faglig uavhengig institusjon sorn driver forskning med 
et samtidshistorisk perspektiv innenfor omd.dent'- norsk forsvars- og sikker-
het.spolitikk. Sovjetstudier og strategiske studier. IFS er administrativt tilknyttet 
Forsvarets hogskole, og virksomheten st~lr under tilsyn av Rc:ldel for forsvars-
studier med representasjon fra Forsvarcts ovakommando, Forsvarsdeparte-
mentet, Forsvards hogskole og Universitetet i Oslo. 
FORSVARSSTLJDIER tar sikte pfi a v::cn: et fomm for forskningsarbeiJer 
inncnfor institusjonens arbeidsomnlder. De synspunktcr som kommer til ut-
trykk i Forsvc.lrsstudier slUr for forfatterens cgcn regning. Hcl eller tlelvis 
gjengivelsc av innholdet kan hare skje mcd forfatlerens samtykke. 
Rcdakwr: Ro(l Tamues 
INSTITUTT FOR FORSVARSSTUDIER - IFS - NORWEGIAN INSTI-
TUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES (formerly Forsvarshistorisk lorskningssen-
ter - Research Centre for Defence History) conducts independent research 
from a contemporary history perspective on defence and security issues. Soviet 
studies, and strategic studies. IFS is administratively attached to the National 
Defence College. and its activities are supervised by the Council for Defence 
Studies, composed of representatives from the Defence Command. the Mi~ 
niSti)' of Defence, the National Defence College. and the University of Oslo. 
Director: Pn~fessor 0/al' Riste, D. Plui (Onm) 
FORSVARSSTUDIER - Defence Studies - aims to provide a forum for re-
search papers within the fields of activity of the Nonvegian Institute for De~ 
fence Studies. The viewpoints expressed are those of the authors. The uuthor's 
permission is required for any r~production, wholly or in part, of the contents. 
Edit(}}:' Ro/j Tanmes 
._,\'ars: T_vpo S£'1l'icc as. Trykk: Hamnwl:\'lad as. Disnilmen gjemwm F(m;t'arcts 
oJ•erkOIWIImldo Dist1ibusjonssentralen. 
/SSN 0333 - 2470 
Page 
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
December 194 7 - a turning point? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
General background, specific conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
British policy toward Scandinavia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 0 
Early Scandinavian initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
Bevin's speech - the catalyst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
Scandinavian reactions to Bevin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
Inter-Nordic discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
Western views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Nordic discordance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
Finland, the second catalyst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
The Norwegian initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
Lange's demarche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
Western response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 
Alternatives: non-aligned or Nordic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 
Thp ." ., e ans summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 
Three Norwegian leaders .......................... . 
The Swedish initiative and the summer of non-events 
Hankey and the interlocking pacts .................. . 
Lange's alternative ................................ . 
The Second Hankey Plan .......................... . 
Three alternatives ................................. . 
Officers and politicians in Sweden .................. . 










The decision to join the North Atlantic Pact constituted a major 
breakaway from traditional security policies in Denmark as well as 
in Norway. Even Sweden, which in the end decided to remain 
nonaligned, went through a period of considerable reevaluation of 
established trends of thought. 
In all three countries, neutrality was traditionally regarded as 
almost an unwritten part of the constitution. Two world wars had 
reduced the notion of classical "neutrality" to a mere word, or to a 
euphemism for the most pragmatic techniques to avoid warlike 
complications. The basic idea of neutrality, however, retained its 
hold on politicians as well as on public opinion. Prevention of war 
must be the predominant purpose of foreign as well as of defense 
policies and, if prevention failed, avoiding involvement in other 
peoples' wars. After more than a year of examination and 
deliberation, Denmark and Norway opted for security under the 
North Atlantic umbrella, while Sweden saw more risk than 
reassurance in a NATO membership. The process was complicated, 
frequently painful to the main actors, and intricately involved with 
major powers' policies. 
It is the purpose of this study to describe and analyze some major 
phases of the series of events that caused Norway to become a 
charter member of the North Atlantic Alliance, and directed 
Denmark to follow. The majority of the material consists of primary 
sources in the archives of the Norwegian Foreign Office, the Public 
Record Office in London, and the National Archives in Washington. 
1 have benefitted from a number of scholarly studies on Swedish 
and Danish policies in the same period. However, my main purpose 
in this study has been to exploit the abundant material that is now 
available from British and American sources. This means that 
events and trends are frequently described the way they were 
known, or seen, or interpreted by these sources, and consequently 
apt to be both supplemented and modified by specialized studies 
based on more complete research in all Scandinavian countries. 
Hopefully, it may at least be possible to avoid major mistakes and 
misrepresentations. 
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December 1947- a turning point? 
Jens Christian Hauge, the Norwegian Minister of Defense in 1945, 
summed up the events in which he was himself a prominent policy-
maker, in a confidential report a few years later. He discussed the 
difficulties he had in tinding a suitable point of departure: ''Easy as 
it is to ascertain that the present foreign and defense policies of 
Norway have their origin in the fate allotted to our country during 
the war, it is equally difticult to determine where the first chapter of 
"the inside story" begins, for it is evident that considerations had 
been made and provisional attitudes adopted in the innermost circle 
around the Cabinet long before the arrival of events that called for 
action."! 
Many commentators maintain that a clear and unbroken trend 
runs from the Norwegian decision to fight the- German invader, on 9 
April 1940, to the decision to join the North Atlantic Pact in 1949. 
The German invasion proved that neutrality was no longer a 
credible guarantee, that Norway needed what came to be called, 
after the war, an "umbrella". Doubts and objections en route were 
only such inevitable hesitations as are bound to appear when one is 
confronted with new policies. 
Others see the decision to join NATO as a sudden and dramatic 
departure from the best established principles of Norwegian foreign 
policy.2 Critical writers have in part been very bitter3 and some 
times strongly suspicious4 toward Norwegian policy-makers of the 
period. Occasionally these writers come close to outspoken con-
spiracy theories. The most severe critics have hinted that Nor-
wegian politicians invited American pressure, organized scare 
campaigns, or manipulated public opinion, during the decisive 
months of 1948-49 or as far back as in the early years of the 
Second World War.s 
Among historians, Nils Marten Udgaard is inclined to stress the 
continuing process theory.6 O!av Riste, writing later and with access 
to British material released under the 30-years rule, does not see an 
unbroken trend. Instead he finds, in his own imagery, a policy of "a 
snake in a tunnel". More specifically, Riste7 differs from Udgaard in 
his evaluation of Soviet-Norwegian relations during the war years. 
In a later work, Riste sees the problem of continuity or change in a 
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wider perspective: "On the level of unspoken assumptions, however, 
the parameters of Norwegian national security underwent no 
fundamental change. The traditional expectations of "in extremis" 
protection by the Western great powers had been and remained a 
necessary condition for any plausible Norwegian defence scena-
rio".s Thus, according to Riste, " ... Norway's accession to the North 
Atlantic Treaty in 1949 was more shadow than substance, and far 
from being a turning point".9 For the sake of clarity it should 
perhaps be added that Riste's analysis deals only with possible 
constants in Norway's strategic situation, not with explicit 
declarations of intent, or public opinion, or political considerations, 
domestic and international. 
ln this study the perspective is more limited. It is a case study in 
policy making. Therefore, it begins at the stage where the general 
situation in international relations had reached a point where the 
premises upon which Norwegian security policy rested no longer 
seemed valid, and new signals were called for. There are good 
reasons for placing this particular occurence in December, 194 7. 
The basic Norwegian tenet until I 94 7 had been that cooperation 
between the major victorious powers should continue in peacetime, 
and consequently, the Security Council of the United Nations would 
be able to harmonize controversial attitudes and fulfil! its role in 
conflict resolution. Norway should do nothing that might in any way 
jeopardize this fragile system. This policy (the "bridgebuilding") 
must necessarily, in a small nation, be a policy mainly of omission 
and abstention. During 1947, however, even this low level of 
ambition became incre:1singly difficult to live up to. As the inter-
national situation deteriorated, Norway's foreign policy gradually 
called forth criticism from both superpowers. This became obvious 
during the second General Assembly of the United Nations. In the 
words of Foreign Minister Lange himself: "During the recent 
General Assembly, the Norwegian delegation has been criticized in 
the Norwegian press for behaving in such a way that Norway, in 
American public opinion, was counted as aligned with the Eastern 
Bloc. On the other hand, the delegation has - again in the Nor-
wegian press- been praised for allegedly rallying around the line of 
the United States in the United Nations".JO "We have" he continued, 
"taken our stand on individual issues, without feeling attached to 
any group. The stand we have taken, has signified that we in certain 
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questions have voted against one party, in others against the other 
one. It has not been conclusive to us whom we voted against or 
whom we voted together with. In our judgment the decisive 
question was whether the stand we took, served to advance the 
purposes that the United Nations have aimed at through its charter, 
and to strengthen the organization itself and the principles of justice 
that we think have to be embodied in the coexistence of states, if 
small states like ours shall be able to endure at all."! I 
What he did not want to state bluntly, was that in his opinion the 
possibilities of bridge-building were almost exhausted. He did, 
however, signal a possible reevaluation: All states, big and small, 
will have to make up their minds as to whether the present 
development may bring with it a danger of war in the world in the 
next years. "The conclusion we, for our part, arrive at, will decide 
whether we shall have to redirect our policies in many areas".I2 His 
concluding remark indicated a possible alternative, inasmuch as he 
vaguely suggested closer cooperation between nations that shared 
basic views on fundamental political values. He was careful not to 
discard the hope for continuing co-operation between all states. 
Everything possible must be done, he said, to prevent a division of 
the world into hostile blocs. There were still possibilities along those 
lines. He continued, however: "the efforts to strengthen these 
possibilities can only succeed in the degree that we are successful in 
entering into an ever closer collaboration, within the United 
Nations, with those member states, also outside the frontiers of 
Norden, that by their attitudes demonstrate that they share our views 
of which are the main tasks in international politics today." 1l 
This conclusion, when read carefully, lists the options that were to 
dominate Scandinavian discussions throughout 1948: to continue 
bridgebuilding as long as any hope remained; to enter in closer 
regional co-operation, within the general framework of the United 
Nations; to limit such co-operation to the Nordic states in the best of 
political traditions; to extend it to UN members "outside the 
frontiers of Norden". The fact that he explicitly pointed to the latter 
possibility made it all the more interesting. What had made Lange 
feel that the time had come for such new perspectives to be 
explored? 
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General background, specific 
conclusion 
The international situation toward the end of 194 7 has been 
examined again and again by students of the cold war and the 
origins of NATO. There is no need to describe it here. The break-
down of the Foreign Ministers' conference convinced Western 
diplomats that the Council of Foreign Ministers must be adjourned 
sine die without reaching agreement on the peace treaties with 
Germany and Austria, and that the negotiations on these problems 
had reached a complete deadlock. Assessing the dangers involved, 
Lunge applied his own criteria. In his analysis, the failure to reach 
agreement, and the violence of reactions on top levels, could no 
longer be explained as outbursts of accumulated impatience in the 
aftermath of war. Present difficulties were forerunners of new and 
lasting problems of a serious nature, first and foremost the problem 
of Germany. No small nation could bridge the gap that had opened. 
The concept of "bridgebuilding" had ceased to function. The time 
had come to look for possible guarantees of security in a world 
where bridges were being deliberately broken. The first alternative 
to be explored was some kind of Western co-operation - there is no 
other possible interpretation of Lunge's conclusion in his address to 
the Starting. But what kind of co-operation did he have in mind? 
Some of his critics have suggested that he was already in favor of a 
military alliance, but, for tactical reasons, did not bring it out into 
the open. There is no support for this in the relevant sources. 
Documents in Foreign Office archives suggest that Lunge's 
misgivings had begun during the second session of the General 
Assembly (December 1947). They also indicate that his new trends 
of thought did not venture beyond political co-ordination within the 
United Nations. 
At the end of the General Assembly meeting, Lange approached 
the Minister of State at the British Foreign Office, Hector McNeil, 
and suggested "preliminary discussions among the Western Euro-
pean Powers before the next Assembly meeting, with a view to 
create a common front on important issues"- Me Neil did not make 
any note on the conversation, nor did Lange. The substance is only 
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known through this brief reference in an undated paper, now in the 
PRO'". After the meeting, Lange received "a friendly message" 
from Me Neil, "as a result of the conversation which they had in 
New York about Anglo-Norwegian cooperation at UNO in the 
future''. 15 Although the information is indirect, it is very precise and 
refers only to issues that come up within the UN. The fact that 
neither made notes on the conversation also indicates that no 
dramatically new ideas were brought forward. But the conversation 
took place at a moment when Great Britain had already to some 
extent revised her Scandinavian policies, and there is a more 
specific British background that deserves attention. 
British policy toward Scandinavia 
The British Ambassadors to Denmark, Norway and Sweden met in 
Stockholm at the end of November 194 7 to discuss, among other 
things, British trends of thought on Scandinavian security policies. 
They summed up as follows: 
Scandinavian staff officers were discussing limited co-operation 
measures. The three Scandinavian cabinets approved, but were not 
otherwise involved. Among the topics discussed, was a possible 
standardization of arms and munitions. There seemed to be 
increasing awareness that efficient Nordic co-operation might 
imply standardization with the United Kingdom as well. For the 
time being, there was nothing much the British could do to influence 
and possibly accelerate this type of integration. The Ambassadors 
recommended discreet sounding of American attitudes towards 
Scandinavian defense eo operation.'" 
This positive British interest bears witness to a general, and 
recent, change of attitude. Speaking very generally, Norway had 
proven slightly disappointing to the British. Sweden was attracting 
more attention, and Danish initiatives had seemed quite promising, 
from the point of view of British security policies in general. 
Norway came out of the Second World War with strong func-
tional and emotional ties to her British allies. Early postwar records 
show, however, that the "bridgebuilding" policy was interpreted in 
London as an unnecessary adjustment to Soviet interests. It was felt 
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that inter-war trends of thought had survived and persisted in 
influencing Norwegian foreign policy: neutralism in general,as well 
as pacifist, antimilitarist and isolationist tendencies. In 1946, British 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Bevin described the Norwegian 
Government as "completely preoccupied with its own affairs and 
out of touch with the foreign affairs situation".!? Nearly a year later 
the Oslo Embassy still reported in a general survey that the 
Government and the general population alike "showed an 
increasing tendency to bury their heads in the snow in the hope of 
avoiding entanglement in the struggle between the Great 
Powers". IS Practical and functional co-operation in military matters 
did not continue to develop the way British authorities may have felt 
reason to expect during the war. For instance, Norway expressed a 
clear wish to have British military advisers withdrawn simultaneou-
sly with the withdrawal of Soviet liberation troops in the extreme 
North-East. Robin Hankey, the head of the Foreign Office's 
Northern Department, saw it as "extremely annoying that the 
Norwegians are so pusillanimous" and, he continued: "I cannot 
conceive what business it is for the Russians that we should have 
military advisers in Norway".I9 
This should not be interpreted as a purely bilateral disagreement. 
It should rather be seen as a sign that while Great Britain, as always, 
had to frame her security policy within a global context, Norway 
was primarily concerned about her possible ability to avoid conflict, 
and therefore did not fit into the British favorite model of a more 
closely united Western Europe within the United Nations, perma-
nently on its guard towards the Soviet Union. 
Although, for reasons that do not belong here, Denmark had not 
had the same type of relationship with Britain during the war, 
similar considerations influenced British-Danish post-war relations. 
Denmark and Norway were not approached or even indirectly 
informed, when serious discussions on a Western European bloc 
were first initiated, in early 1947. 
As for Sweden, there was considerable bitterness in London in the 
immediate post-war period, dissatisfaction with Swedish attitudes 
during the war, and fear that Swedish influence was pulling the 
Scandinavian neighbor states away from their inclination toward 
the West, and might keep them definitely away from a Western 
orientation. The firm commitment to neutrality that was still 
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axiomatic in Sweden, appeared to the British as sheer wishful 
thinking. In terms of military strength, Sweden was among the 
strongest smaller nations in Europe. Her defense had been 
continuously built up during the war, but had not been able to 
follow the enormous technological development of the belligerents. 
For instance, the impressive Swedish Air force was sadly lacking in 
radar. In terms of access to information on military research, 
purchase of equipment, exchange of personnel for training etc., 
Sweden was placed in the third category of priority, together with 
the Soviet Union and Eastern European states in general, although 
the restrictions may not have been rigorously applied. Denmark and 
Norway belonged in the more favored group, together with France 
and the Benelux countries. They had higher priority, but were not 
given access to strictly secret technology, which was reserved for 
the US and Commonwealth countries. This differentiation had 
already been adopted during the war: Sweden should not reap 
advantages from her neutrality, but Norway should be given special 
status in relation to the major Allies.2o Denmark, although not 
formally an allied nation, was a former German-occupied territory, 
which brought her into the same category as Norway. 
The British policy of restraint and reticence came up for revision 
during 1947. In June of that year, the Cabinet received evaluations 
that they had requested from their military advisers. Both the Chiefs 
of Staff and the Joint Planning Staff were emphatic in pointing out 
the advantages that British control of Scandinavia could offer for 
Great Britain: 
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"(a) We would have admnced air bases which would halve the distance 
to Moscow. We would also be ve1y favourably placed for rocket and air 
attacks on Russian communications with Westen1 Europe. 
(b) Our early waming system would be greatly impr01•ed. We would, 
moreove1~ be well placed far fonvard on the direct air route between 
Westem Russia and the industlial East of the North-Amelican continelll. 
(c) We would be ·well placed to cover naval and air operations in nonhern 
waters and the Baltic 
(d) Additional man-power and valuable raw materials 1\'ould be 
available to assist our war effort. "" 
There is no reference here to a possible formal Scandinavian 
defense alliance. The Chiefs of Statf did conclude, however, that it 
would be almost as important to keep Scandinavia un-occupied as 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands. To this end, the British had an 
interest in fast and far-reaching co-ordination, including the 
important military resources of Sweden. Implicitly, such co-
ordinated forces would have ties to Great Britain. For instance, the 
Chiefs of Staff presupposed a standardization of arms. They 
suggested " a full investigation of the potentialities of a Scandi-
navian and Western European bloc in war against Russia". 
These trends of thought do not represent a sudden reversal; the 
new approach, and in particular the recognition of Sweden's 
strength and importance, had been maturing for some time already. 
Nor should they be interpreted as specific plans, or new military-
political guidelines. The British Ambassadors to Copenhagen, Oslo 
and Stockholm were instructed to lie low, avoid publicity on related 
questions, and not to go beyond expressing British sympathy for 
Scandinavian co-ordination of arms.22 
Several reasons may be suggested for this circumspect attitude. It 
seemed advisable not to invite Soviet criticism and possible counter 
activity; progress towards a more comprehensive Western bloc was 
slow and difficult; the United Kingdom had little to offer in terms of 
what Denmark and Norway would need for armament; and last, but 
not least, the British had neither the motivation nor the ability to 
push forward in this area without having sounded opinions in the 
United States. They had not been strongly encouraged so far. The 
Americans were inclined to hold back. As late as October 1947, 
John Hickerson, head of the European desk in the State Department, 
saw a Scandinavian defense union as "unlikely".2J Toward the end 
of 194 7, the American attitude changed rather abruptly. The 
increasing American commitment in Europe was of course the 
underlying trend. The break-down of the Foreign Ministers' Council 
initiated a new interest in the Nordic neutrals. 
Seen against this background, the contact between Lunge and 
McNeil, in December 194724, appears not as a mere straw in the 
wind, but as a tentative approach to what was soon to become a new 
point of departure. However, it was still only the initial stages of a 
long process, and catalysts were needed. The first one came when 
Ernes! Bevin felt ready to give ofticial signals, toward the end of 
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January. The second came when events in Finland and Czechoslo-
vakia led to serious re-examination of security policies in 
Scandinavia. In the meantime, exploratory movements of a more 
discreet kind had been undertaken from the Scandinavian side; from 
certain points of view, Denmark was in the vanguard. 
Early Scandinavian initiatives 
Danish naval officers were concerned about the entrance to the 
Baltic - a concern that has remained. They felt that it was vital to 
keep the narrow straits open. If, in a possible crisis, a major power 
wanted them closed, Denmark could not prevent this without 
assistance from Sweden and Norway. Admiral Vedel, Commander-
in-Chief of the Danish Navy, held conversations with Swedish and 
Norwegian opposite numbers. His initiatives were silently and 
unofficially approved by the Danish cabinet, but dealt only with 
technical questions, and were practically limited to naval problems. 
However, there were obvious reasons why the two states on the 
Scandinavian peninsula should be interested in common army 
problems. Swedish-Norwegian contacts in this area were much 
more reticent. As viewed from London, the Danes actively 
promoted a closer relationship between the Scandinavian countries 
and the UK; Sweden had become an interesting possibility in a 
partnership; Norway was held back hy what to the British seemed a 
traditional policy of appeasement, in spite of the fact that both 
tradition and prognosis made the UK a natural partner for her. 
On lower, non policy-making levels, Swedish o!Iicers were likely 
to encourage informal contact with the British, but remained wary 
of extensive practical co-ordination. The Swedish military attache 
in Oslo, talking to his British opposite number, agreed that 
standardization within Scandinavia was desirable, "but would not 
commit himself with regard to an extension of standardization with 
the Western Powers". "We then spoke of the new contacts between 
the Swedish and British Armies. He said that Swedish officers who 
had attended courses in the United Kingdom had benefited greatly, 
but he did not know whether any British officers had attended 
courses in Sweden".25 
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It had already been suggested that prominent representatives of 
the Swedish armed forces should be invited to the Royal wedding in 
London. In due time, the question came in a different form, namely 
a suggestion that General lung, the Swedish C-in-C, and General 
Douglas, C-in-C Army, should be invited ''as soon as possible" as 
official guests of the British Minister of Defence and the Army 
Council respectively. The suggestion gave rise to a general 
discussion within the British Foreign OtJice, where the question was 
seen as a related part of a much more comprehensive policy. This is 
clearly reflected in the pros and cons of the commentators. On one 
hand, an invitation seemed "an important step in the right 
direction". The formation of a western bloc was now "an inevitable 
and essential object of [British] policy". "In relation to any such bloc 
Sweden occupies an important position as the leading Scandinavian 
power and one immediately confronting the Soviet-controlled area. 
It might therefore be argued, that we should aim at bringing 
Sweden, which is now inclined in some ways to linger on the fence, 
more expressly on to our side and, if possible, eventually bring her 
into some regional defence arrangement with the Americans and 
ourselves." On the other hand, nobody was prepared to answer 
questions that might easily be put, as to "what aid we could possibly 
give the Scandinavian countries". The same was probably true from 
an American perspective. Balancing these two sets of considerations 
against one another, Foreign Officials arrived at different 
conclusions, but when the papers reached Hankey's desk, he came 
out very clearly on the negative side: "I would expect the 
Scandinavians to be ready for military collaboration if and when 
they are assured of American as well as British backing in case of 
war. Would it not be better therefore to wait or at least to suggest a 
less official and spectacular visit?"26 This serious and comprehen-
sive discussion must be explained by the fact that we are here 
confronted with a problem that became permanent in the following 
months: how could one attract a hesitating partner without having 
substantial advantages to offer him. There were also the political 
risks involved: 
"In short, we have two d(f]iculties to call/end with: 
(a) that by b1inging the Swedes (or othen) here prematurely they find that 
we have no adequate plans to supp011 them 
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(b) that by stalling them off too long they might come to the conclusions 
that we had no plans at all to help them, and make an an·angemem with 
the Russians. 
For the momelll the first danger seems to us to be the greatest." 
The revived American interest in Europe was to alter these premises 
too. In his concluding remark, Hankey took care to point it out: 
"It has accordingly been agreed that we must look at the defence problems 
of Scandinavia 011 an even broader basis and that if discussio11s are held 
with the Americans regarding secwity the talks will include Scandinavia. 
After talking to the Americans we are more likely to know where we stand 
in all these matters and by then our own planning and thinking will have 
further adap1ed iJself tu 1he new circumstances. "27 
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Bevin s speech - the catalyst 
There is no need here to describe the alacrity and the enthusiasm 
with which Bevin responded to the new American signals about 
Germany and, implicitly, about Western Europe as a whole.28 The 
definite break-down of the Foreign Ministers' Council occurred on 
Dec 15 1947. On the 17th, Bevin had his proposal ready. The real 
issue, according to him, was "where power should rest in Germany 
and Europe".29 The time had come to organize an association of 
Western democracies: 
"This would not be a formal alliance, bw an undemanding backed bv 
power. money and resolute action. It would be a sort of !Jpiritut.;l 
federation of the West. He knew that formal constiTUtions eristed in the 
U.S. and France. He, lwweve1; prefen-ed, especially for this pwpose, the 
British conception of unwritten and informal undel:'lfandings. If such a 
poweiful conso/idalion of the West could be achieved il would then be 
clear Jo !he Soviet Union that having gone so far they could not advance 
any jimher. " 
The idea - for it could hardly be called a plan - was immediately 
submitted to George Marshall,30 who may not have found it as clear 
as he would have preferred to see it. There followed however, in 
rapid succession, a series of memoranda prepared by Bevin for his 
Cabinet. J I Taken together, they translate his "association" concept 
into more practical application. They may also indicate that his 
apparent vagueness in the conversation with Marshal! may have 
been tactical, that he was temporizing while waiting for more 
specific information about American intentions. He did, however, 
remain undecided as to whether he envisaged a formal type of 
alliance. In his "First aims ... " he referred initially to an effort to 
"organize and consolidate the ethical and spiritual forces inherent 
in ... Western civilization ... by creating some form of union ... 
whether of a formal or informal character" but on the following 
page, left the door open by adding that the union need not take the 
shape of a formal alliance "though we have an alliance with 
Francel2 and may conclude one with other countries".JJ Invercha-
pel, the British Ambassador to Washington, was more explicit in a 
17 
personal letter to Marshall on January 13th. According to him, 
Bevin would suggest to Bidault "forthwith" that the British and 
French governments should make a joint effort towards a treaty 
with Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, along the lines of the 
treaty of Dunkirk. 
There was no doubt that Denmark, Norway and Sweden should 
be included in the future system. In his "First aims ... " Bevin 
outlined "a Western democratic system comprising of, if possible, 
Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, Portugal, Italy and 
Greece". Inverchapel, in his letter to Marshall, added to the outline: 
"Having thus created a solid core in Western Europe, consideration 
should then be given to the best means of developing the system 
which Mr. Bevin has in mind and to associating it with other states 
including Italy, other Mediterranean countries, and Scandinavia."34 
In other words, the scope was expanding rather than contracting, 
and the "formal alliance" concept emerged very clearly. 
However, the Nordic states were not included when Bevin came 
forward with his first public announcement of the new policy. In his 
famous speech of January 22, 1948, he did not mention the Nordic 
countries at all. This should not be taken as an indication that he 
had now revised his concept of their possible role in his grand 
scheme. He only postponed the suggestion, biding his time. In his 
first listing of possible associates, or members of the alliance, he 
included a waiting list: Spain and Germany should be considered 
"as soon as circumstances permit".35 Before the public version36, 
however, Bevin seems to have moved Scandinavia into the same 
category as Spain and Germany, although for very different reasons. 
The "circumstances" that put Germany and Spain on the waiting 
list, had of course to do with their roles in the Second World war and 
the reluctance of public opinion to readmit them to good political 
company at this early stage. In the case of Norden, there must have 
been a clear feeling that the idea should be given time to mature, 
and that rushing in with public suggestions at this time would be 
premature and probably at this stage even counter-productive. The 
British Ambassador to Sweden paid a visit to the FO in early 
January, and saw the early reference to Scandinavia, but was 
instructed to keep it confidential37 
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Scandinavian reactions to Bevin 
There was, indeed, considerable doubt among diplomatic observers 
about the varied attitudes in Nordic countries. 
So far, Denmark was clearly the nation that had come forward 
most freely in requesting British advice and assistance, both on 
strategy and armament. In unusually outspoken phrasing, Hankey 
and the Copenhagen Embassy referred to Denmark as "a possible 
eastern projection of England".38 Trade relations pointed in the 
same direction, and so did considerations of grand strategy. The 
defeat of Germany had put an end to the traditional Danish 
dilemma of having to tread warily in the danger zone of overlapping 
German and British interests. The nearest continental power was 
now the Soviet Union, whose zone of occupation reached a point 
few miles south of the Danish border. A modus vivendi with the new 
neighbor would clearly benefit from Western political backing. The 
Danish problem was to what degree, and how ostensibly, such 
backing should be sought, so as to function efticiently without 
generating additional security risks. The Foreign Office also 
favored a patient and cautious approach, or, at a minimum, was 
prepared to countenance it. They were particularly aware of 
Denmark's domestic difficulties. There was no solid public opinion 
behind the rearmament policy. The Radicals remained entrenched 
in traditional pacifist or anti militarist trends of thought. Defence 
forces had to be rebuilt almost from scratch, and their actual 
strength was disputed. Foreign Minister Rasmussen told the British 
Ambassador that General Giirtz's figures of Denmark's fighting 
force "represented an aspiration rather than actual policy". 39 The 
best British contact had been with naval personell, mainly with 
Admiral Vedel; there was, however, considerable distance between 
him and Giirtz, personally, professionally and politically. The 
admiral represented naval tradition, the general had his background 
in the militarily unorthodox Resistance and in its political left wing. 
Nevertheless, a parliamentary majority supported the rearmament 
effort, and the Parliamentary Defense Commission was to be recon-
vened shortly. Ambassador Randall did not hesitate to confirm the 
British "sympathetic interest" and added that "a united Northern 
will to resist aggression could be an important element in main-
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taining peace". Mr. Rasmussen agreed, but warned of substantial 
political difficulties.•o In short, neither party had gotten beyond a 
common wish to promote a vague concept of military co-operation 
in Scandinavia, with unspecified support from the United Kingdom, 
which again depended on still-to-be discussed American support 
that could hardly be expected to materialize forthwith. 
Swedish attitudes were less ambiguous, and also less promising 
from a British point of view. If the British effort to improve relations 
with Sweden had, in general, been expected to create a more 
promising climate for official and determined co-operation in 
political and military matters, they had fallen short of fulfilling 
expectations so far. On the contrary, there were clear signs of 
Sweden entrenching herself safely in what was to critical British 
eyes an illusory neutralism. Reports from Stockholm were described 
as disclosing "a wide gulf between Swedish government's thinking 
and that of our own".4I The State Department received similar 
messages. The Swedish Prime Minister was primarily interested in 
domestic problems and "stated an inability to understand the 
interest of the American people in Europe's problems".42 In Lon-
don, Hankey noted that Swedish cabinet members would be "most 
unlikely" to agree to anything in the nature of proper staff talks.43 In 
other words, he saw no possibility of going beyond discussions of 
supplies and technicalities, interspersed with personal opinions of 
varying interest from Swedish officers. Foreign Minister Unden was 
inclined to make excuses for the Russians and dubious about Anglo-
American policy in Europe.'14 There was a long way to go before 
serious discussions on common defense problems might become 
possible, to say nothing of mutual commitments. There were, 
however, other factors involved. In terms of British imports Sweden 
was Great Britain's most important trading partner in 1947. The 
Board of Trade intended to vigorously stimulate British exports to 
Sweden in 1948.45 Boheman, the Director General of the Swedish 
Foreign Office, declared officially that Sweden wholeheartedly 
supported the Marsh all program.46 The initial qualms as to whether 
participation in the Marshall plan would be consistent with a policy 
of impartial neutrality seemed to be a thing of the past. Boheman 
himself had not refrained from revealing occasional disagreement 
with Unden in the past. But now, he said to a British diplomat, the 
Foreign Minister's attitude had changed somewhat "in the right 
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direction"47 Another well placed source was quoted as having said 
that Uncten was deeply shocked and antagonized by a Soviet 
demarche that went contrary to the principles of free speech.48 
Generally speaking, Sweden was doubtless the bastion of dogmatic 
neutrality in Norden. In addition, Sweden was most immediately 
concerned about how a more Western orientation would affect 
Finnish-Soviet relations. The traditional special relationship to 
Finland, as well as Swedish strategic interests in the Baltic spoke 
heavily for caution and forethought. 
Later in 1948 Norway was to become the main mover in the 
direction of Western alignment. This seemed far from obvious at the 
beginning of that year. In his general survey for 1947, Ambassador 
Collier described the Norwegian attitude in the United Nation's as 
"still one of excessive caution (not to say propitiation of the Soviet 
Union)".49 In his academic way, Collier may have winced at 
"appeasement". Lange's replies to criticism on this count had been 
unconvincing. In a general impression, however, Collier saw much 
to suggest that the Norwegian people as a whole were ready for "a 
more positive "Western" policy" .SO Collier was no doubt aware of 
the contact between Lange and McNeiJSI, and added that Lange 
"had become convinced that it was hopeless to reason with the 
Soviet Union and her satellites". On his return to Norway, he had 
given several indications that he thought it was time for Norway "to 
abandon "bridge-building" once and for all and throw in her lot 
with the Western Powers." Quite another question was whether "the 
rank and file of the left" were as yet in a position to appreciate the 
full implications of recent events52 - in other words, whether the 
social democrats would subscribe to a possible new signal from 
cabinet members. In great secrecy, the British Air Attache, Wing 
Commander Coward, had been approached by Norwegian Major 
Ji\rstad, who was at the time the equivalent of Director of 
Operations in Norwegian Air Force Headquarters. The Major, 
acting entirely without authority and on his own behalf, asked 
whether Coward would be prepared to discuss defense plans with 
him. He added that neither his senior officers nor the Minister of 
Defense "dared even to draw up any defense plans for the 
Norwegian Air Force".53 From the context, it appears that what 
Ji\rstad had in mind, was such plans as might include the possibility 
of closer British-Norwegian co-operation. Coward replied evasi-
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vely. He explained that "if Air ministry agreed to the preparation of 
Joint Defence Plans without both governments' approval - which 
was at the moment extremely unlikely" - he would prefer to talk to 
Jorstad's superiors. In his report to Ambassador Collier, he added 
that he did not think the Air Ministry would consider staff talks with 
the Norwegians alone "since the question forms part of the larger 
problem of Scandinavian Defence" .54 In general, he seems to have 
evaluated Jorstad's initiative as not much more than the serious 
worries of an individual with strong personal convictions. So did the 
Ambassador. In his comment, however, he stated that this gave 
additional confirmation that the question of military help was now 
definitely "on the tapis". He hoped British authorities had begun to 
consider this aspect of the situation. He also felt that if compre-
hensive defence plans had not as yet been finalized, it was in all 
probability because of "the desire to wait and see whether they can 
be co-ordinated with those of the Swedes and ultimately with our 
own and American plans".55 
In the months to come, Halvard Lange was to play an important 
role. In January 1948, however, to the extent that he turned away 
from "bridge-building" he was still mainly concerned about Nor-
way's attitude in the United Nations, where he realized the policy of 
judging all cases on their merits was no longer viable. There was, 
however, a point where political decisions overlapped with military 
considerations. The Svalbard problem rested heavily on Norwegian 
minds, as long as Soviet intentions remained unclear. Arctic 
strategy might direct power interests in that direction.56 
The Norwegian position would be easier, he told Collier, "if we 
were sure that the American strategists did not intend to "write otl" 
Scandinavia in the event of a conflict". There was reason to believe 
that they had, "and in general we know nothing of their military 
plans". Collier was as evasive as his Air Attache had been a few 
days before, but he carefully reported to the FO, and Hankey noted 
in the margin: Voila! Hankey's exclamation point, and Colliers 
reticence, reveal the essential elements of the current situation: 
problems might possibly arise, where Western global strategy 
became of vital importance for Norway; and the Western powers, 
while they were moving towards the policy of the outstretched 
hand, could not commit themselves - the British because they could 
not speak from strength, the Americans because they had not made 
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up their minds. Hankey's comment, written out in longhand, might 
have been something like: at last, it is out in the open. 
The functional ties created by the war were as important mili-
tarily as politically. A Norwegian brigade was part of the occu-
pation forces in Germany, which means it was under the aegis of the 
British Army of the Rhine, worked with British equipment and 
followed British routine. The agreement that governed the 
arrangement was due to expire on March I, 1949. In a personal 
letter to his British opposite number, Defense Minister Hauge 
approached the problem and pointed out that the absence of the 
Brigade constituted a weakening of Norway's own immediate 
preparedness. From this point of view, it seemed desirable to bring 
the Brigade home.57 Alexander felt that this would be "little short of 
disastrous". What if Danish, Dutch and Belgian forces were to do 
the same? In that case, British occupation forces would be reduced 
by approximately one quarter. The issue did not cause any lasting 
problems, but reveals clearly to what extent scarcity of men and 
material was relevant to both parties, and worked against a realistic 
approach to problems of military assistance. 
Inter-Nordic discussions 
However, the situation was not as fluid as it might appear from 
public utterances on the official cabinet level. Contact and 
consultation on the service level had reached a point where more 
tangible results seemed within reach; defense ministers were 
becoming increasingly involved; confidential exchanges of opinion 
within Scandinavian cabinets led to similar inter-Scandinavian 
contacts between cabinet members.ss At the end of January 1948, 
American and British diplomats reported reliable information that 
Swedish Norwegian staff talks were in progress in Oslo. The initia-
tive was Swedish. The Swedish General Staff representatives were 
to move on to Copenhagen for similar discussions in early February. 
Heading the Swedish group was colonel Thunberg, a prominent Air 
Force ofticer with considerable international experience; as Stock-
holm reported to the FO, his background was not "entirely 
technical". There was considerable hope of rapid progress, such as 
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the establishment of a Scandinavian defense bloc within the next 
ninety days.59 
Since the initiative came from Sweden, the FO was likely to 
assume that the ultimate purpose would be a consolidation of 
Scandinavian defense forces on a platform of non-alignment. No 
doubt they were wary of such development. 
The origin of this information is as interesting as its content. It 
came from the American military attache in Oslo, who for the first 
time appeared to be definitely faster and better infom1ed than his 
British colleagues. The reason is obvious: on January 28, he had a 
long interview with Defense Minister Hauge, at the latter's request. 
Hauge also summoned the American attaches for Air and Navy. 
Speaking quite openly, he wanted to find out how important 
Norway was in American strategic thinking, and what help could be 
expected from America in a critical situation. The attaches were 
further informed that Norway intended to approach the U.S. about 
assistance with military equipment. Two important elements in later 
discussions are now clearly evident: The vital importance of 
military assistance, and the Norwegian desire for some kind of an 
opening toward the West. To what extent these aims could be 
reconciled with basic Swedish premises remained to be seen. 
The whole issue had now progressed to Cabinet level. Danish 
Minister of Defense, Rasmus Hansen, came to Oslo at the end of 
January to sound Norwegian opinions, and continued from there to 
Stockholm. This move foreshadows another long-term trend, the 
Danish wish to act as an intermediary, to harmonize and'reconcile 
conflicting Swedish and Norwegian attitudes. Hansen left Norway 
with certain misgivings. He told Swedish cabinet members that 
certain leaders within Labour and in the cabinet aimed at 
Norwegian association with a Western bloc.6o The only motive 
offered was "an outspoken apprehension of being excluded from 
Western association". This second-hand rendering of Hansen's 
impressions61 may not be complete; it does, however, bring out one 
more basic problem: a Norwegian desire to keep both options open, 
or more precisely, not to buy a Scandinavian military alliance at the 
price of foregoing Western support. 
Thus, in early February 1948, a number of themes had emerged 




Such was the general situation around the time when Bevin 
launched his appeal for "the free nations of Europe" to "draw closer 
together" and stated that "the time is ripe for a consolidation of 
Western Europe".62 Given the fluidity of the situation, it is not diffi-
cult to explain why he refrained from any allusion to Scandinavia. 
Answering a direct question by Norwegian Ambassador Prebensen, 
he said that he did not want to embarrass the Scandinavians at a 
stage where there was so little to offer them in terms of security.63 
Considering the many signs of rapid development, it is equally easy 
to see why the British watched the Scandinavian scene carefully. 
Bevin directed that "a thorough study should be made of the 
Scandinavian position in the light of our new Western Union policy 
rising''.64 
Until the last days of January 1948, both British and American 
analyses and situation reports were frequently vague and couched 
in loose and general terms. They assessed public opinion about the 
Soviet Union, and used that as an indication of Western sympathies. 
Not until this juncture did they seriously seek, or receive, infor-
mation on high levels of policy-making. They were, however, 
clearly aware of the trend towards Scandinavian co-ordination in 
military affairs, and viewed it with sympathy, which was also the 
best part of what they had to offer at the time. The Foreign Office 
was already thinking farther ahead, and definitely had the political 
will to move forward in the direction of a Scandinavian defence 
arrangement with efficient support from the West. Foreign Minister 
Bevin himself was the strongest advocate of this course. But in 
practice, Western support of this kind was synonymous with 
American support and commitment. There was still considerable 
doubt as to how strongly the U.S. would back up the Western Union 
which was now in the making. With the Scandinavians themselves 
so reticent, Bevin let sleeping dogs lie, and waited for developments. 
Hankey echoed Bevin's opinion: the Danish hesitations, for instance, 
demonstrated "how very wise our tentative approach to the Scan-
dinavians ... has been ... We shall clearly have to handle the Scandi-
navians most carefully".65 The immediate reference here is to 
Bevin's January 22 speech. "It was much better that the Scandinavi-
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ans should come around and enquire" than that they should be 
embarrassed by a reference to them. However,the same reasoning 
prevailed one month later. 
The American attitude was somewhat clarified during January 
1948, but not as fast and as forcefully as Bevin would have wished 
for. Secretary of State Marshal! had afllrmed, in reply to advances 
from the eager Belgian Prime Minister Spaak, that the U.S. was 
mainly concerned about European efforts to increase production 
and trade, balance budgets and stabilize currencies.6<> As for 
security, that was intimately connected with the German problem, 
which involved questions as to "what three Western Powers can do 
to increase security in Western Europe." Participation by other 
Western European Powers might be possible if a satisfactory form 
could be found, but Spaak was told that this should be kept 
confidential "as we have not yet discussed this with the British and 
the French".67 The diplomatic correspondence between London and 
Washington in January 1948 clearly reveals to what extent the 
American attitude remained receptive and temporizing.68 
At this point (January 10, 1948) Bevin had outlined his master 
plan69 and was ready to approach Marshal! in more explicit terms. 
He set out his views in the memorandum of January 13,70 which 
includes the programmatic passage: "I believe therefore that we 
should seek to form with the backing of the Americas and the 
Dominions a Western Democratic system comprising Scandinavia, 
the Low Countries, France, Italy, Greece and possibly Portugal." 
Marshal! responded with considerable sympathy and with qualified 
commitment: Bevin 's initiative was of fundamental importance 
and deserved "his continuing study and that of his European 
colleagues." The United States would do "everything which it 
properly can" to assist them.'l Among Marshall's advisers, there 
was considerable reserve as to what could properly be done. George 
F. Kennan welcomed the undertaking warmly, but warned against a 
treaty modeled on the British-French Treaty of Dunkirk. "Military 
union should not be the starting point. It should flow from the 
political, economic and spiritual union - not vice versa." He also 
pointed out that the military note might frighten some, "notably the 
Scandinavians". This remained Kennan's basic view throughout the 
following events. The same trend of thought is set forth clearly and 
concisely in a memo from the State Department's Division of 
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Western European Affairs on the same day. "The security problem 
seems primarily economic, secondly, political, and thirdly, mili-
tary". These three problem areas were not seen as separate and 
unconnected, but the economy was fundamental. "A healthy 
economy is the basic essential, both for the well-being of the 
individual and his resistence to ideological infection, and for the 
development of the fundamental industrial and agricultural factors 
in military potential".72 Hickerson, who as Director of the Office of 
European Affairs was to play a prominent role in further 
development, also voiced his reservations over common security 
arrangements. The U.S. would carry out the obligations it had under 
the Charter of the U.N. 
However, any plan developed by European nations in the 
direction of U .S. participation in defense arrangements beyond this, 
would require careful study. There were arguments on both sides 
with respect to direct U.S. participation in defense schemesJ3 
The State Department also maintained its cautious attitude after 
Bevin's speech. As Under Secretary of State Lovett carefully pointed 
out in a letter to Inverchapel: The U.S. would "carefully consider the 
part it might appropriately play in support of such a Western 
European Union, established presumably in harmony with the 
Charter of the United Nations"J4 
At the time, the third-force theme was very much present, in the 
U.S. as well as in Europe, the concept of a Western Union relatively 
independent of the United States. In conversation with Ambassador 
Inverchapel Hickerson adopted the formula. He had envisaged "the 
creation of a third force which was not merely the extension of US 
influence but a real European organization strong enough to say 
"no" both to the Soviet Union and to the United States, if our actions 
should seem so to require"7 5 The strongest warning against a third 
force policy came from Europe, from Bidault. He should know, he 
stated, nobody had tried so hard as he, without success.76 No doubt 
he referred to his own form of bridge-building, which broke down 
when he was unable to win Soviet support for French views on the 
future of the Saar, and he remained wary when the concept of third 
force formations in French domestic policies came to the 
foreground in January 1948. 
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Nordic discordance 
Scandinavian reactions to Bevin's speech were not unanimous. In 
Sweden, Unden was very clear. Sweden remained non-aligned, and 
would join no bloc.77 His words were widely interpreted as a "no to 
Bevin"-statement,78 an impression that Unden himself tried to 
modify, without altering his trend of thought. In Denmark, Prime 
Minister Hans Hedtoft stated emphatically that Denmark would not 
be placed in any bloc. "We are members of the United Nations, and 
shall do our duty there as a Nordic country."79 His clear refusal of 
alignment as well as his declaration of faith in a Nordic approach 
and in the UN, were obviously intended to quell rumors that arose 
from Bevin's speech. In Norway alone, a more positive response 
could be registered. The board ("representantskap") of the Labor 
Party's Oslo branch passed a resolution on the Marsh all plan, which 
invited the Cabinet to support all efforts to co-ordinate economic 
reconstruction and political co-operation between all democratic 
countries. It added: "The initiative that the British Labour 
government has taken, must also have our support." Among those 
in favor were Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen, chairman of The 
Confederation of Trade Unions Konrad Nordahl, and the powerful 
and dynamic secretary general of the Labour party, Haakon Lie. In 
view of what happened later, the resolution should not be 
interpreted as a decision to go all out for Bevin, and far less for 
possible military implications. Lie was to become a dedicated and 
determined supporter of NATO; Gerhardsen did not really commit 
himself until almost a year later. The resolution, likely as not, was a 
rather vague common denominator for fairly different attitudes. To 
Prime Minister Gerhardsen, the accent was on economic and, to use 
Bevin's words, "spiritual" solidarity. He was very much aware of the 
fact that the United Kingdom, as well as Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway, had a Labour government. SO The resolution also included a 
third force trend of thought: " ... detente and peace can best be 
created by the Western European countries, dedicated to democra-
tic government and an increasing degree of planned economy, 
growing strong enough to stand on their own legs - independent of 
the two superpowers." 
Lange, however, had not seen the draft, did not wish such a 
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resolution, and disapproved of it when it came. In his public 
comments, he remained receptive to Bevin's suggestions- only at a 
later stage did he use the word "plan" - but was not determined to 
follow up on it. His interest and sympathy transpired, however, as 
far as the desire for more trustful political consultation was 
concerned. 
The situation was somewhat clarified during the traditional 
parliamentary debate following the "speech from the throne" that 
began on February 11, 1948. A prominent conservatives! invited 
the cabinet to declare a policy in support of the co-operation that 
Bevin had suggested. He felt there was strong popular support for 
this, except among those "who had manifestly chosen the East." 
The Prime Minister answered that Norway had received no 
invitation to discuss possible participation in a Western bloc, nor in 
a Nordic one. Bevin's trend of thought was entitled to every 
attention among all those who took an interest in the future of 
Europe. But Bevin had not put forward any plan. The Foreign 
Minister again reviewed the international situation. Only the most 
grave dangers could force Norway to take a side in a possible bloc-
building, only a real threat of war. For the moment, he saw no such 
danger. He remained concerned, however, that the leading powers 
might "slide apart". Even this could not compel Norway to choose. 
There were other possibilities, such as reform of the UN, or as a 
minimum, a new style and new procedures for contlic resolution. 
Economic and political reform might also enable Western Europe 
to play a more important role and to exert more influence in 
international politics. He did not have in mind a neutralist or anti-
American bloc. He emphasized the hope that a stronger Western 
Europe might play the role of a mediator and conciliator between 
the superpowers. It is worth noting that Lange now deliberately 
disassociated himself from neutralism. On the other hand, he 
probably never came closer to speaking for a third-force philo-
sophy, at least not in public. From this point of view, he remained 
faithful to bridge-building, on a higher level, and recognizing the 
necessity of being able to speak from strength. 
There was a general trend in the debate to focus on economic and 
political aspects, and to include both Nordic and Western European 
perspectives. 
Lange's public commitment to a more Western orientation did 
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not come until weeks later :"We do not want to exclude ourselves 
from the possibility of discussing a closer co-operation from our 
side, in the direction of the West ... We have felt that a closer 
Western European co-operation offered possibilities for creating a 
real foundation for an independent democratic policy of peace for 
Western European countries, and it has been clear to us throughout 
that such a co-operation between the countries in our part of 
Europe is in no way against the Charter of the UN."i2 
By then, an entirely new situation had arisen. The events in 
Czechoslovakia and in Finland called for fundamental examination 
of security concepts and policies. 
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Finland the second catalyst 
The disturbing reports from Czechoslovakia that began coming in 
the following week, and the crisis and coup d'etat that followed, 
need not be described here. Suffice it to say, that while the events 
disturbed Lange personally - he was a personal friend of Jan 
Masaryk, and had recently had him as his guest in Oslo - they did 
not seriously affect Norway's strategic situation. Tl:e shock was a 
political and moral one. If this could happen, worse could follow. If 
Czechoslovakia, traditionally facing both East and West, with its 
strong social democratic tradition and its bridge-building potential, 
could be politically bulldozed so ruthlessly, who could feel safe 
unless well protected? The situation in Finland, however, led to 
more drastic Norwegian initiatives than anybody could have 
imagined before, and to positive British/ American response. It also 
set the stage for serious discussions on a Nordic military alliance, at 
cabinet level. 
The Fenno-Soviet negotiations became publicly known when 
Stalin's letter to Paasikivi was published on February 28, 1948. In 
relation to the possible Scandinavian defense union, they brought 
another two vital questions to the foreground: Was a similar Soviet 
approach to Norway to be expected? and how would a Fenno-
Soviet treaty affect Scandinavian political relations and defense 
planning in general? The former problem immediately became a 
grave concern to Norway. The latter affected all of the Northern 
nations, but was, as a matter of course, especially important to 
Sweden. 
While Western European statesmen, led by Bevin, Spaak, and, on 
his own terms, Bidault, were striving to establish foundations for a 
Western Union, the European nations in the Soviet zone of 
influence had been brought into a system based on different 
principles, a network of bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union.83 
With Finland added to the list, Norway would be the only remaining 
European nation facing the Soviets' western frontier that did not 
have a similar treaty calling for friendship, assistance and 
consultation. The problem came to a head during the critical days 
around March 8, 1948. Warnings, signals and indications, however, 
had been abundant for some time already. The strong Norwegian 
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reaction during the crisis must be seen against this background of 
suspense and apprehension. 
Diplomatic circles in Helsinki had long been speculating about 
"the current volume of rumors about Russian pressures on Finland". 
The French Minister even reported that Finnish Foreign Minister 
Enckell, off the record and in private, had asked a prominent 
Swedish guest on February 16th what the Swedes would do if the 
Russians came across North Finland and demanded transit through 
Swedish Lapland.84 The French military attache to Helsinki also 
said he had reported on the Fenno-Russian pact as early as the 
middle of February, and, he added, the Soviets would not stop at the 
Fenno-Norwegian border. ss First-hand reliable information, howe-
ver, is not likely to be found outside confidential and partly private 
documents on Finnish-Swedish relations. 
The Finnish Minister to London kept in touch with the Foreign 
Office, and was informed, unofficially, that the phrasing of the draft 
seemed "dangerously vague" and there was some concern as to 
whether it might leave the way open for Finnish independence to be 
undermined, "and also for Soviet pressure to be exerted on Norway 
and Sweden". 86 
The pact's impact on Sweden and Norway was no doubt the 
major British concern. In a comment on the situation in Czecho-
slovakia, Bevin fully accepted the opinion of his representatives in 
Prague, that there was not much that the Western powers could do 
except to give signals that this must be the last coup of its kind 
against "the forces of Democracy". Bevin found this last paragraph 
"of particular interest".87 The British Chiefs of Staff were consulted 
about the military aspects of what advice the UK could give to the 
Finns about accepting or refusing the Soviet offer of a mutual 
assistance pact. They stated, on February 28th 1948, that the Soviet 
Union was able to dominate Finland completely, if determined to do 
so. Strategically, the position of Finland was not a major British 
concern. The line to take must be decided "in the light of the effect it 
will have on the other Scandinavian countries." The immediate 
purpose must be to stiffen the morale of the Nordics. The only 
possible military means to that end would be naval exercises in the 
vicinity of Scandinavia, and American participation was "most 
desirable". The Air Force might also speed up the departure of a 
visit to Sweden by R.A.F planes, planned for the near future. The 
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Foregin Office held back. Such gestures might lead to increased 
Soviet pressure on Finland, and the exact implications of the Soviet 
move were not yet known. 88 
At this juncture, the Foreign Office had clarified its position on 
Scandinavia in two documents of major importance. The Northern 
department had delivered the analysis that was requested earlier,89 
and Bevin had personally included Scandinavia in a tour d'horizon 
included in a comprehensive memorandum for the Cabinet.9D The 
Northern department delivered a historical retrospect that led to an 
analysis of the current situation. The conclusion was, as before, that, 
above all, "Scandinavia" would want to know what degree of 
British assistance could be expected to a Scandinavian commori 
defense policy; that Britain could only frame obviously evasive 
replies; that this was likely to remain so until more was known 
about American plans in the event of an emergency. Bevin gave an 
assessment of the present situation: after Czechoslovakia, the next 
step for the Soviets might well be in the direction of Italy and/or 
France, with possibly a threat to the independence of the 
Scandinavian countries. The Finnish treaty might point towards 
further "consolidation of their security in that part of Europe". Once 
their situation in Finland had been fully assured they might lind the 
time ripe for "further progress".91 He pointed out that this could 
only be a tentative estimate of Soviet intentions, but "when they 
reach the point of being put into action, Soviet plans mature very 
quickly and they are, moreover, very tlexible"92 - in other words, 
one must be prepared for sudden and perhaps dramatic events. 
Such, then, was the general background. On the regional, Nor-
wegian stage, rumors and speculations abounded; the Utenriks-
departement (the Norwegian Foreign Office) monitored them 
carefully, discarded most of them, and was left with a handful that 
carried enough weight to be taken very seriously, and some that 
called for rapid and dramatic action. Among the more irresponsible 
news mongers was for instance the columnist Ralph Hewins. 
According to him, the Soviets were likely to advance into Northern 
Norway any time. His words did not carry much weight in the 
Norwegian Foreign Office. Alistair Cooke, however, created 
considerable anxiety. In his Washington correspondence to the 
Manchester Guardian, he stated that "some members of the State 
Department ... and some members of the Army ... have to face 
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some ugly presumptions that Czechoslovakia and Scandinavia were 
probably lost to Western Europe ... ".93 Beginning on March 5th, 
even more alarming messages came in to the Utenriksdepartement. 
They have played a considerable role in later discussions, and there 
has been a tendency to assume a direct causal relationship between 
the "warnings" and the strong reactions of the Norwegian 
Government. Before turning to the documents, however, it seems 
imperative to survey the general international situation in which 
they belong. 
As British and American foreign-policy-makers saw it, there was 
a real possibility of communist majority in the imminent Italian 
elections, and of vigorous communist action and perhaps decisive 
influence in France. Czechoslovakia was lost to Western demo-
cracy. Finland was facing an uncertain future, and might be sliding 
in the same direction. The six-power conference in London, in its 
final communique on March 5 inaugurated a German policy that 
strongly antagonized the Soviet Union. The danger of pro-Soviet 
communist factions undermining governments from within was 
evoked throughout Western Europe. In deep secrecy, leading 
Western statesmen considered the military aspect of the Western 
Union. There was no general fear of war in a near future, but a 
strong and widespread feeling that Soviet challenges might have to 
be met, and that they should be met with determination, and backed 
up by military strength. In hindsight, there may be strong indications 
that both Soviet military capability and political aggressiveness 
were overestimated at the time. On the other hand, so much hinged 
upon Stalin himself. and how far he was gone in his transformation 
from policies of ruthless but rational calculation to uninhibited and 
unpredictable spontaneity. 
In the Nordic nations, three main trends were obvious in the first 
days of March I 948. Denmark, Sweden and Norway were equally 
anxious to strengthen their defense forces. Attempts to organize a 
Scandinavian defense co-operation had reached cabinet level, but 
met with serious political difficulties there. The main problem was 
that Norway wanted what could still only be vaguely described as 
an opening toward the West, Sweden presupposed non alignment in 
peacetime, Denmark was hesitant. 
In terms of military strength, Sweden was the only force worth 
mentioning. As a neutral during the Second World War, she had 
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built up an army, navy and air force that no grand strategist could 
afford to neglect. Norway ami Denmark could only be a liability to 
any partner in any alliance. To Sweden a Nordic alliance could only 
be a military burden, until the two neighbors had considerably 
strengthened their forces. For Sweden to join a Scandinavian 
alliance would imply a calculated risk, but also, seen in a wider 
scope, clear advantages, if the alliance were committed to non 
alignment. With Norway in a Western alliance, Sweden would be in 
an uncomfortable strategic position, to say the least, in case of a 
confrontation between the superpowers. Western bases in Norway 
would bring advanced British, American and Soviet positions within 
hours of Sweden's frontiers, if not nearer; and there was almost a 
conviction in the Swedish cabinet that bases in Norway, probably 
American ones,94 was the price Norway would have to pay for 
being taken under the Western umbrella. Unden had no faith in the 
deterrence concept, and was almost exclusively concerned about 
the possible consequences of a Western alliance at the outbreak of a 
war. He was convinced that traditional neutrality must be a better 
protection. Some prominent writers from his political entourage 
went farther: "Neutrality means that whoever attacks, becomes our 
enemy. At lesser cost, neutrality cannot be bought."95 Strictly 
speaking, even an alliance with Norway and/or Denmark would be 
a deviation from absolute non-alignment. But they were not major 
powers. The guidelines of foreign policy set out in a programmatic 
declaration in October 194596 referred only to major powers as 
possible bloc-builders. 
Unden's position was emphatically clear, but not universally 
accepted as representing the one and only Swedish policy. Both 
British and American diplomats and observers repeatedly reported 
on dissenting opinions within the Swedish armed forces97 and even 
within the Swedish Foreign Office itself98. There were also 
suggestions that the elections in the fall of 1948 might bring 
changes. In the meantime, Western comment tended to zero in on 
Unden personally, as the embodiment of obstinate illusion. There is 
no doubt that by the beginning of March, 1948, he was deeply 
worried about Norway turning toward the West. For this reason he 
felt that discussions of common Scandinavian defense measures 
should not be carried much farther forward until the political 
premises had been set out clearly and unequivocally. 
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This may well explain, at least in part, why the technical 
discussions on service level did not ascend to government level, as 
they had been expected to do in the last days of January 194899. 
According to plan, the Swedish General Staff representatives were 
to continue from Oslo to Copenhagen for similar discussions there. 
No Danish service representatives had come to Oslo. Politically 
more important, however, was a visit by the Danish Minister of 
Defense, Mr. Hansen. Officially, he came to address a meeting of 
the Oslo Arbeidersamfund, in reality as much for private 
conversations with Hauge and others. It was rumored, at the time, 
that the Swedish Minister of Defense, Mr. Vougt, might be expected 
in Oslo a little later. lOO No deductions should be made from mere 
chronology. But three facts remain to accent the importance of 
these few days; Hauge's frank discussions with the Americans; the 
high-level Scandinavian service discussions that ran parallel; and 
the possibility of continued talks between the Nordic Ministers of 
Defense. Hauge was working hard to weigh the pros and cons of the 
two options, Scandinavian and North Atlantic; he had to relate his 
conclusions to trends of thought among his closest advisers, in 
parliamentary circles and particularly in the Commission on 
Defense;IOI and this was going on at the time when Minister Han-
sen's visit brought the difficulties of the choice out into the open, at 
Cabinet level. 102 Hansen continued his mission in Stockholm.103 In 
his talks in Oslo, Hansen could not fail to note how strongly many 
political leaders felt that any alliance would need solid support from 
the West, and that general assumptions or tacit undcrstandings to 
that effect did not seem tangible enough. He learned about Lange's 
contact with McNeil, 104 and became aware that public manifesta-
tions of these new signals was only a matter of time. He brought 
along with him Haakon Lie's draft resolution lOs. Above all, he may 
have been impressed by Hauge's summation.I06 The Danish cabinet 
continued to sit on the fence. While Prime Minister Hansen, on 
January 30th, reaffimJed Danish non-alignment, Foreign Minister 
Rasmussen on February I st explored the possibilities of an 
American military guarantee.I07 The Swedish attitude remained 
unchanged. A programmatic government declaration ("regerings-
meddelande") on February 4, backed up by Unden's statement in 
the Riksdag on the same day. reaffirmed that Sweden had no 
intention whatsoever of associating itself with any bloc, "be it an 
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explicit pact of alliance or but silent understanding of common 
military action in the case of a conflict". lOS To Swedish statements 
of the kind, there was at the time an omnipresent but officially 
unspoken qualification, succinctly put by Defense Minister Vougt in 
a private conversation with the outspoken American diplomat, 
"Doe" Matthews, the Counselor of the American Embassy, on 
January 26, and quoted by Matthews as follows: "(!) if the time 
ever comes when Sweden "must detlnitely choose sides" there is no 
doubt that Sweden will join the West (2) until it is finally compelled 
to choose sides Sweden will avoid associating itself with either East 
or West". Matthews, not a man to mince words, added, in paren-
theses: "(Incidentally I find that this dunk position is a favorite one 
here. It has become a basic specious tenet in the creed of Swedish 
self-deception)". 1119 
During this impasse, Scandinavian defense negotiations remained 
in abeyance. The Swedish Minister of Defense did not go to Oslo. 
His Norwegian opposite number contemplated going to Stockholm, 
but decided against it.1 10 Routine Scandinavian meetings in the 
following weeks (Prime Ministers 9 February, Nordic social-
democrat co-operation committee) dealt mostly with economic 
issues, the Marshal! plan etc., while marking time on defense 
problems. During the conventional meeting of Nordic Foreign 
Ministers in Oslo, February 23-24, Lange proposed discussion on a 
joint defense program. Ill The outcome only confirmed what was 
already known, positions remained entrenched. According to a high 
official in the Norwegian Utenriksdepartement," 2 as quoted in an 
American report, "Norwegians (backed by Icelanders) had hard 
time endeavouring to persuade Swedes and Danes to modify their 
neutrality stand".113 This may possibly overstate the Icelandic 
position. Icelandic Foreign Minister Benediktsson usually preferred 
to stay out of such discussions, on the grounds that they involved a 
Western Union, whereas Iceland was definitely an Atlantic 
nation.ll4 
The events of early March broke the deadlock. More precise 
indications of a possible Soviet move reached the Ministery of 
Foreign Affairs, and seemed to carry more weight than previous 
rumors and specula tions. 11 5 Reports from Norwegian representati-
ves in Moscow, Warsaw and Helsinki all indicated that Norway 
must be prepared to receive a Soviet approach similar to Stalin's 
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letter to Paasikivi.116 Considering the negotiations Norway had 
conducted in the fall of 1946 on Soviet desiderata in Svalbard -
including common defense measures - the cabinet felt that such an 
offer might be coming, and that it might be "accompanied by some 
kind of pressure." 117 
Ambassador Berg's message from Moscow, March 5, recommen-
ded that the Utenriksdepartement reexamine notes and correspon-
dence related to plans for a contemplated Soviet-Norwegian non 
aggression treaty "in 1930 or 1931 ".11& In a supplementary 
message, Berg reported that "one of his Soviet contacts" had 
referred to this in a discussion of recent events in Finland.II9 The 
name of the "Soviet contact" was kept strictly secret at the time. It 
transpired later that it was none other than Madame Kollontay, a 
veteran in Soviet Scandinavian relations, and widely thought of as a 
friend of Norway. Ambassador Berg did not exclude the possibility 
that her remark might contain a discreet warning. It may also have 
been mere conversational fencing on her part, something along the 
line of: what is wrong about non-aggression treaties? You almost 
concluded one with us once. This was the general feeling among 
leading Swedish personalities. 120 One primary source is missing. 
Lange received at the time a personal letter from Kollontay, "in a 
little blue envelope".I2I The note was not included in the archives of 
the Utenriksdepartement, nor was it found among his private papers 
after his death. At the time, he felt that Berg's theory could not be 
ignored. There is no evidence, however, that Kollontay offered any 
conclusions concerning the current Norwegian position.I 22 Lange 
ordered a thorough review of the relevant negotiations during 
1928-1930. 
On March 6, a Saturday, Swedish Minister to Warzaw, Clas 
Westring, called upon his Norwegian colleague, minister Danielsen, 
and informed him that "a Polish socialist, who did not himself 
belong to the Government, but was close to it, had told him that 
when the Soviet Union had had its way in Finland, it would turn to 
Norway. Norway was to be occupied, but not Sweden. Once the 
Soviets were established in Norway, they would be in a position to 
direct Sweden as they wished to." There would be no British or 
American help readily available. Both powers would have to 
concentrate on the Mediterranean area. Westring added that his 
source, whose name he of course withheld, was very well informed. 
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For instance, he had known about the impending events in 
Czechoslovakia as early as a week in advance. Danielsen offered a 
somewhat skeptical comment of his own, to the effect that decisions 
of such importance were made in Moscow, not in Warsaw, and that 
Stalin was not apt to reveal his plans outside a very limited group of 
confidants. t" 
A third message came from Helsinki, by way of Washington. On 
March 6th, American counselor Huston told Andvord that Ameri-
can sources in Helsingfors expected a Soviet move to offer Norway 
a pact on the Soviet-Finnish model. The report had gone to the State 
Department, and was relayed from there to the Oslo Embassy. 
Shortly after the same information, from the same source, came in 
through Norwegian press attache Hedemann in Helsingfors. A 
Norwegian evaluation of the source was not unequivocally 
positive.tl4 Ambassador Bay followed up Huston's demarche on 
Monday, March 8th. He pointed out that he had received the report 
from Washington without any further instruction, but deemed it 
advisable to let the Utenriksdepartement know, and hoped it would 
be useful. As to the value of the information, he said that he was not 
in a position to judge about that. t25 
These are the three so called "warnings" that were considered 
most seriously by Lunge and his staff U6 Their importance and 
impact have been evaluated in various ways: Huston's communica-
tion as American intervention, pressure, or bulldozing, allegedly 
supported by underhand suasion; all of them as excuses for the 
"Westerners" ("vestorienterte") to push forward in a policy they 
were already dedicated to; or, seen from the opposite side in 
frequently polemical debate, as indications of sinister Soviet 
intentions, too serious to be neglected, whether they were absolutely 
accurate or not. Lange had his own interpretation. The various 
signals seemed to him to be deliberate leaks; as Norway was not 
expected to accept a treaty of the kind, the purpose could be to 
provoke a statement to the effect that Norway did not intend to 
conclude any such treaty whatsoever. This would effectively bar 
Norway from accession to any formalized Western alliance. At this 
juncture, Lange was convinced that the Western option must be 
preserved be it in combination with a Northern alliance, a third 
force policy in Western Europe, or in a North Atlantic context; the 
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latter possibility, however, was the farthest from his mind, or rather, 
had not yet appeared as a practical alternative at alL 
Drastic Norwegian initiatives followed. On March 8th, after 
consultations in an extraordinary cabinet session, Lange asked the 
Ambassadors of the United Kingdom and the United States what 
assistance Norway could expect in case of aggression. He made it 
clear that Norway was determined to turn down a possible Soviet 
invitation to negotiate a pact, regardless of the answers he might 
receive from the Western powers, but he was anxious "to learn as 
much as possible on how these matters were evaluated in London 
and Washington".127 During the day he also consulted his closest 
advisers in the Ministry as well as leading parliamentarians. 
Seen against the general background, as outlined above, it seems 
rather simplistic to explain all this merely as a reaction on infor-
mation received over the last few days. The "warnings" arrived at a 
crucial moment, and provided the impulse that tipped the scales that 
had long been in a state of precarious balance. On March 5th, Labor 
members of the "preparedness committee" !28 decided to support an 
additional grant of I 00 million kroner for military purposes. The 
Ministry of Defense had already initiated measures to increase 
general preparedness. In Sweden, Commander-in-Chief Jung 
reportedly advocated further strengthening of Swedish forces in a 
meeting with defense Minister Vougt on March 5th. 
Another serious sign of alarm in Norway was Defense Minister 
Hauge's visit to London on 5th and 6th March. There was no 
secrecy about it. Hauge had been inspecting Norwegian troops in 
Germany, and it seemed natural that he should continue to 
London.129 However, he also came to conduct important conversa-
tions of a more specific nature. 
Only 30 at the time -just barely the minimum age for cabinet 
members - Hauge had an impressive record. Abandoning a 
promising career in Law School, University of Oslo, he became 
prominent in military resistance from a very early date, and was its 
leader from the end of 1942 throughout the war, which may well be 
the European record, all the more so, since Norwegian military 
resistance was tightly unified, consolidated and remarkably faction-
free. He had himself travelled clandestinely between occupied 
Norway and London headquarters several times, and was listened to 
on high hush-hush levels in London. Many doors remained open to 
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him in the United Kingdom. On this visit, he saw his opposite 
number, A. V. Alexander, who as First Lord of the Admiralty in the 
Second World War had ample opportunity to turn his eyes towards 
Norway. and took considerable interest in intelligence from 
Stockholm, also a center of Norwegian intelligence activities. Do 
Hauge submitted to him a questionnaire including a series of 
questions as to the British attitude in the event of a Russian attack 
on Scandinavia. 13 1 As a result of this, the British Chiefs of Staff 
prepared an outline of their views. However, events now moved so 
rapidly that the problem had to be reviewed in an entirely different 
political context. il2 The case of Norway became an important 
consideration in the British American consultations that were now 
moving rapidly forward towards a common security policy in the 
Atlantic and Western European areas. Important conversations 
were scheduled for the Paris meeting in the middle of March. As a 
result of the Norwegian demarche on March 8th, Lange was 
immediately brought in, and on the highest level. In Paris, he was 
invited to discuss Norway's security problems with Bevin, Bidault 
and Marshall, personally and confidentially. 
The Nmwegian initiative 
The ten days following March 8 1948 were a period of rapid change 
and dramatic events which went far toward clarifying American 
and British attitudes toward Norway, and revealed Western 
readiness to strengthen the Norwegian position in case of a Russian 
demarche. The following weeks became, from the Norwegian point 
of view, a period of waiting for more specific information. Nor-
wegians gave more open signals of their determination not to close 
the opening toward the West. The Danes continued to mark time. 
The Swedes were increasingly worried that Norwegian policy 
would break away from traditional neutrality, and thereby 
jeopardize Sweden's position as well. In the meantime, the British 
made concentrated efforts to strengthen the new-born Western 
Union, economically as well as militarily. They were, however, 
petitioners themselves. A rapid military build-up in Western Europe 
was only possible with the active support of the United States. Such 
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momentous new departures in American security policy were only 
possible after the long and laborious procedures required in 
representative democracy. Congressional approval of mutual 
military commitments became dellnite through the passing of the 
Vandenberg resolution, on June 11. Not until then could the 
necessary, complex and multilateral negotiations get under way. It 
was a period of energetic activity in the United States, and of not 
quite patient expectancy in Western Europe. As for Scandinavia, the 
next landmark was lO be a Swedish initiative in early May. 
Lange 's demarche 
Lange's words to the Western Ambassadors were cautious and low-
tuned in the sense that they did not unnecessarily enlarge upon any 
worst case scenario, although they were laconically emphatic. His 
action, however, was unusual, and by Norwegian standards quite 
unprecedented. It had strong backing from constitutional authori-
ties. In the early hours of the March 8, Lange conferred with Prime 
Minister Gerhardsen. Immediately after, the two met with the 
Presidents of the Starting. All approved of the suggested sounding. 
The contents of his conversations with the Ambassadors are 
known from numerous documents.I33 He seems to have used similar 
phrasing in both conversations. 134 "I told ... that what one could say 
with certitude at the present stage, was that an efllcient war of 
nerves had been initiated against Norway. With verisimilitude one 
could say that we in a near or possibly distant future, and most 
likely in a near future, would be confronted in one form or another, 
with the question of a pact or an agreement with the Soviet Union. I 
further said that in this situation I was going to ask the Cabinet for 
authorization to ascertain, in a non-committal way, how one in 
London and Washington, on the highest political and military level, 
looked at our strategic position, and whether it would be at all 
possible to assist us militarily in case of an aggression. I further said 
that regardless of what answer we got, it was my meaning, and, I 
believed, the attitude of the entire Cabinet, that Norway must 
answer "no" to any proposal of agreement or pact, and face all 
consequences. For the time being we were aware that we were, 
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militarily, practically speaking, powerless, but in the worst possible 
case we must engage in a desperate struggle which could not last 
long militarily, but would lay the foundations for resistance from the 
whole people during a possible occupation. I further said that I 
expected, after having conferred with my colleagues in the Cabinet, 
to come back to the question of officially, but not in a binding 
manner, to ascertain the United States Government's view on and 
evaluation of the possibilities of assistance to Norway in case of 
. " aggressiOn. 
Western response 
Ambassador Bay did not trust his experience as a diplomat and 
remained mainly receptive to Lunge's approach.135 In fact he did 
not make a more extensive report until a few days later. Collier, a 
diplomat of considerable experience, had behind him a long career 
in the Foreign Office and a wide experience in dealing with British 
Norwegian relations. He felt more free to discuss political problems 
with Norwegians, was better informed by his superiors, and more 
apt to be consulted by them. 
Taken together, these first conversations reviewed a series of 
possibilities: a closer relationship with the Western Union; some 
kind of less definite form of support for the Bevin plan; a possible 
naval demonstration off Norway; a "training flight" by American 
planes over Norway and possibly other parts of Northern Europe; a 
Norwegian declaration that Norway had no plans of concluding any 
pact whatsoever. 
As we have seen,l36 the idea of a naval demonstration had been 
introduced before in London, and rapidly whittled down, for 
practical as well as political reasons. The idea was reviewed on 
March 9, after Collier had reported on Norwegian anxieties. The 
Admiralty maintained that the leave period for the Navy was to 
begin on March 20 and continue for more than a month. Any 
cancellation of leave might give the impression of "some kind of 
mobilization". The Admiralty felt that this question should be 
considered by the Chiefs of Staff, not by the Admiralty alone. In a 
meeting with Bevin and Alexander (FO and Defence) on March 12, 
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representatives of the Admiralty stated that mounting a task force 
would dislocate all plans for training and leave, and "reveal the fact 
that the Admiralty was only able to undertake this exercise by 
sacrificing the general efficiency of the Navy." Routine exercises in 
the North Sea by the beginning of May would to some extent avoid 
these difticulties. The question was referred to the Prime Minister 
for decision. 137 He took the view that regular training operations, 
located in "northern waters" should be sufficient.138 In the end, 
nothing much came out of it, except routine movements, including 
visits to Kiel with small ships. There was, throughout, a clear 
political inclination toward a demonstration of naval strength. The 
practical difficulties, however, were decisive - in other words, there 
was no sufficient strength immediately available. The Chiefs of 
Staff shared this opinion.l39 As a result, the matter was never 
thoroughly discussed with Norwegian authorities. As for Bay's 
suggestion of a "training flight" with B-29 bombers, Bay himself 
was not overly enthusiastic. He could well imagine that it might 
cause nothing but irritation, but also that there might be situations 
where, on the contrary, it might contribute to a Norwegian feeling 
of security. Lange replied off-hand that he would not consider such 
a step "fortunate" at this juncture, although situations might arise 
where it could have to be reconsidered.I40 
In a larger perspective, both Ambassadors made allusions to the 
Western Union. Bay asked Lange point-blank about Norwegian 
views on participation. Collier chose a more indirect approach, by 
pointing out that rapid decisions now, if not carefully considered, 
might preclude later accession to "the Bevin plan".Lange set forth 
his reservations. In the first place, neither Denmark nor Sweden 
were prepared to take such a step, and it was a serious matter for 
Norway to move in a different direction. Secondly, many 
Norwegians would be opposed because the tradition of neutrality 
still had a strong grip on people. He could easily imagine that future 
developments might lead to revisions of opinions. However, a 
Western Union that included military agreements would meet with 
even more important inhibitions than would a merely political 
union. Bay said the United States considered that military aspects 
should not, for the time being, be brought into discussions on the 
Western Union. In other words, no immediate military backing 
could be expected from that quarter. Collier was more explicit on 
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military assistance, and possibly better informed. He stated that one 
could hardly expect independent military appreciations from 
London, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff were still in function, and 
such questions would be referred to them. 141 Lange found this 
particularly interesting. 142 He was not aware that preliminary 
appreciations had already been made, but was soon to be informed 
that his appeal had added a sense of urgency to British and 
American considerations. 
In America, the Norwegian question was placed before the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff on March 1, as a result of the conver-
sations between Hauge and the attaches.l43. The alarming report 
from Oslo was immediately forwarded to the Secretaries of Army, 
Navy and Air Force. 144 The CIA's Review of the world situation as 
of March 6 had, apparently for the first time, included a paragraph 
on Swndinavia. 145 More of them were to follow. London, however, 
again put a strong shoulder to the wheel. Collier retlected that there 
might be something to be said for inviting Norway immediately to 
"join the Bevin pact". !This had indeed been suggested by the head 
of Norwegian military intelligence "to his contact in the Embassy". 
Collier did not approve, mainly on the grounds that he did not think 
Lange would welcome a formal invitation just yet.l46 ln London, 
Alexander was about to send Bevin a memo about conversations 
with the Chiefs of Staff, concerning military implications of British 
foreign policy in general. He immediately added a separate note 
about his talks with Hauge. 147 Bevin gave considerable emphasis to 
the news from Norway. A possible Soviet threat to that country 
would of course immediately concern the British. In addition, 
however, it provided a fresh argument for Bevin to use in his 
untiring efforts to engage the United States in military co-operation. 
He dispatched a long message to his Washington Embassy. Two 
serious threats, he stated, might arise shortly: a political threat 
against the Western Union, and now, in addition, "an extension of 
the Russian sphere of intluence to the Atlantic". A bold move was 
needed, and there was no time to lose. Bevin considered that the 
most effective course would be "to take very early steps, before 
Norway goes under" to conclude "a regional Atlantic Approaches 
Pact of Mutual Assistance". The Western Union could not defend 
Scandinavia against Soviet pressure, and its member states were not 
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all equally interested in Scandinavia. Bevin suggested to work for 
three separate systems: 
"(i) The United Kingdom - France - Bene/to,: system with United States 
backing; 
(ii) A scheme of Atlalllic seculity, with which the United States would be 
even more closely concen1ed; 
(iii) A Mediten·anean secwity system, which could pm1icularly effect 
lta~v. "~<s 
Bevin added that "in view of the threat to Norway, the Atlantic 
security system has become even more important and urgent".l49 It 
seems futile to discuss which was his primary motif: sympathy for 
Norway, British strategic interest,or the desire to prod the US into 
more vigorous support for the extended Bevin plan. They all worked 
together. 
Washington did indeed respond quickly and firmly. Marshall 
immediately forwarded Bevin's suggestions to Forrestal as a "top 
secret, personal, eyes only" message;15o he informed British 
Ambassador lnverchapel that the US was prepared to "proceed at 
once in the joint discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic 
security system" and invited British representatives to Washington 
"early next week"; 151 he sent a message to Lange, through the Oslo 
Embassy, that the US was giving "most urgent consideration to 
question of Norwegian security" and was in communication with 
the British Government about the Norwegian situation". 152 Lange 
had already left for Paris, to attend a meeting on the Marshall plan. 
Bay delivered the message to Prime Minister Gerhardsen, who was 
very pleased and immediately informed Lange in Paris.I5J 
As soon as the American response was known, the Foreign Office 
instructed Ambassador Collier to bring the Norwegian Government 
a message along the same lines, and informed him that the 
American Ambassador had been instructed to concert his action 
with Collier. 
In short: Both the US and the UK had given strong and immediate 
support to Norway. The US had definitely taken the lead. In British 
eyes, this had been an end in itself, and the UK was more than 
happy to follow up. The practical handling of affairs in Oslo was to 
be in the hands of the British Ambassador, as the more experienced 
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diplomat. Both London and Washington felt that further conversa-
tions should be held at the Marshal! plan meeting in Paris, where 
both Bevin and Marshal! were to attend, together with the Nordic 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 
Alternatives: non-aligned or Nordic 
There were, however, more options open. If the Soviet Union did 
invite Norway to sign a treaty on the Finnish model, a possible 
answer could be that Norway had no intention of signing any pact 
whatsoever. 
In fact, members of the government had discussed that possibility 
at a very early stage. There were two main arguments in favor of 
this policy. In the first place, it was consistent with the strongly 
embedded desire to stay out of foreign entanglements. From this 
point of view, such an answer would satisfy both left-wingers and 
traditionalists. In addition, it would leave doors open for a Swedish-
Norwegian understanding. Whether such widely different motifs 
could be reconciled, remained to be seen. The quest for Nordic 
unity, however, was bound to make itself strongly felt. Secondly, 
leading politicians were acutely aware of the importance of public 
opinion. According to Lange,l54 those members of the Government 
who were best informed on trends of thought among Norwegian 
workers in general, considered that an answer along those lines 
would have widespread support, if it was given on the grounds that 
Norway was not going to associate herself with either side in the 
East-West controversy, but remained committed to the charter of 
the United Nations. On the other hand, a possible Soviet move 
might be made for the very purpose of eliciting such an answer, so 
as to have Norway proclaim herself, at least implicitly, committed 
to non-alignment. 155 This would go contrary to Lange's thinking at 
the time, to say nothing of Hauge's. Other cabinet members had 
been less opposed to such a declaration. On March 15, however, a 
unanimous cabinet approved of Lunge's demarche, 156 and so 
far, at least, opted for the opening toward the West. The British 
immediately made their attitude clear. Without specific instructions, 
Collier warned against commitment to a policy of "no pacts of any 
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kind". I 57 The warning was emphatically repeated from London on 
March 16: any Norwegian concession to "the East" would be the 
first step on a slippery slope, and inevitably lead to dependence. 
Bevin was going to stress this point when he saw Lange in Paris. 
When they met, however, the Norwegian decision was, for all 
practical purposes, already made. On March 13, Lange had been 
authorized by the Prime Minister to inform the Soviet Ambassador 
to Paris about general feelings among Norwegians toward a 
possible Soviet approach - if he happened to find a suitable 
occasion. I 58 Alternatively, Norway might have approached Sweden 
too, asking for a preview of Swedish attitudes in case of a Soviet-
Norwegian crisis. This would have emphasized the Norwegian 
desire to keep the Nordic option as open as the Western one. Since 
no such initiative was taken, this remains hypothetical. It might be 
argued that not even Sweden had sufficient potential for efficient 
aid in an acute crisis; that a long-term, sustained Norwegian 
rearmament would equally have to rely on American supplies; that 
a formal request for Swedish appreciations might embarrass 
Sweden in a delicate situation; that consultations on service level 
had already failed to convince policy-makers that a common 
platform could be found. Nevertheless, staff conversations conti-
nued.l5<J According to American reports, Hauge and Lange, on 
March 11, had explicitly agreed to the continuation of common 
defense talks "on highest level".l60 This should probably be read as 
"on the highest military level". Norwegian Lieutenant General Ole 
Berg went to Stockholm to confer with General Jung, the Swedish 
Commander-in-Chief.l6 1 Berg had organized the Norwegian 
"police forces" in Sweden during World War II, and was very well 
connected in Swedish circles. This included General Jung. A 
common Swedish-Norwegian stand, if supported by high level 
technical co-ordination, might prove to be a stronger deterrent than 
a general, but unspecified, promise of Western aid, contingent upon 
arrangements that remained to be studied and were unlikely to 
materialize swiftly. 
Parallel to this, Hauge invited the American Attaches to another 
round of conversations, on March 19.162 
By this time, an additional question was drawing near and apt to 
be asked openly soon: Would the Western powers, in their own 
interest, deem it necessary to support a Nordic or Scandinavian 
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alliance, even if it proclaimed itself strictly non-aligned? In Sweden, 
this was already a strong assumption, and became a weighty 
argument in later debates. It also fitted in well in Danish thinking at 
the time. 
The special relationship between Danish Naval intelligence and 
its British opposite numbers continued, and seems to have been 
intensified by the events of early March. It was also extended so as 
to involve members of the American Embassy in Copenhagen. On 
the morning of March 8, Captain March told Naval Attache 
Captain Derek Wyburd about recent developments in Nordic 
defense negotiation on service level, and Wyburd learned that the 
same information was given to the Americans, although in deep 
secrecy. Up to that point, the Danes had been "most chary" in 
informing Americans. March said that there was now agreement in 
principle on training methods and standardization of arms and 
equipment. Politically, however, Norway appeared to feel more 
attached to a link with Great Britain than with the other 
Scandinavian countries. The Danish Minister of Defense, Rasmus 
Hansen, was very much in favor of a Scandinavian bloc, but the 
Danish Foreign Office held back, for fear of political repercus-
sions.I63 It soon transpired that the Danish Navy might be prepared 
to commence "unofticial staff talks" on possible British assistance 
in case Scandinavia became a victim of aggression. For the first 
time it was cautiously suggested that Army representatives might 
also come in. March also hinted that the subject might be taken up 
"on a higher level". Ambassador Randall asked for instructions. He 
was not personally prepared to encourage such discussions.I64 The 
Foreign Office was inclined to find the time ripe for more open 
talks, but advised to wait for the outcome of the conversations to be 
held in Paris. Hankey warned that Morch was "always ahead of his 
Government on this."IoS 
However, the British Naval attache, Captain Quistgaard, was 
called to London, and brought back to Admiral Vedel what the 
Danes had requested, an informal paper on the strategic position of 
the Danish Navy, including defense planning. The paper was also 
shown to Defense Minister Hansen. 166 
The Danish Government may not have known exactly how far 
ahead of them Captain March was likely to be, and may not even 
have wanted to know. It is evident from the context that Admiral 
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Yedel was behind his Chief of Intelligence. The American Embassy 
estimated, at the time, that the Government was "not completely 
unaware of these activities, but [was] not participating in them.l67 It 
seems a sound assumption. As far as Foreign Minister Rasmussen is 
concerned, he had the reputation of being an official rather than a 
policy maker. Within the Cabinet there seems to have been a 
general feeling that important decisions about Danish security 
policy were contingent on decisions that had to be made elsewhere, 
to the extent that the best attitude would be to wait and see. 
However, the events of February and March gave rise to con-
siderable anxiety in Denmark as well as in Norway. Counsel or Poul 
Bang-Jensen of the Danish Embassy to Washington played an 
important role in this connection. By the beginning of March he felt 
deeply worried about the immediate future,'"' and was sent to 
Copenhagen by his superior, Ambassador Kaufmann, to report 
extensively. He arrived there on March 15, and his reports gave rise 
to serious concern as well as to irresponsible rumors. Events 
culminated in the so-called Easter crisis, "pi\skekrisen". The cir-
cumstances accompanying his report are still being discussed in 
Denmark.l69 Bang-Jensen had formed the impression that there was 
danger of "Soviet action on Denmark and possibly Norway in the 
immediate future" and that the five-day Easter holiday might be an 
opportune time. 170 He recommended joining the West as soon as 
possible, and said the U.S. was annoyed at Denmark's lack of 
initiative in that direction.171 In addition he pointed out that 
American Air forces needed Denmark as a place from where 
Moscow could be attacked. When the Danish Foreign Office let 
Ambassador Marvel know, he immediately reported, m and 
received instructions to tell his informant that the story was "of 
course, without foundation". The State Department, however, had 
"no desire [to] throw cold water on Danish awakening to realities or 
Danish attempts [to] think out own plans to resist aggression." 173 
Doubtless, the Easter crisis added momentum to the re-examina-
tions of security policies that were now going on in the three Nordic 
countries.174 Incidentally, it also put an end to the tenuous solidarity 
between Danish communists and other Resistance veterans. On 
March 23, Danish Foreign Minister Rasmussen sent for Ambassa-
dor Marvel and "openly disclosed acute nervousness of Danish 
Government". He was reluctant to break up Scandinavian solidarity, 
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but expected Sweden to maintain its neutral attitude, "and therefore 
Denmark must determine independently its own course". The 
Danish course, however, had not been determined yet, and was to be 
discussed in Cabinet and in Foreign Affairs committee meetings 
later in the day. 175 The outcome was that Denmark's ultimate 
course of action was unlikely to be determined until after the results 
of the Italian elections, and the terms of the Finnish-Soviet 
agreement were known. 176 In the meantime, to quote Captain 
Morch again, "everything had to be done so secretly that nothing 
was ever put in writing". 177 
On that very day, the third meeting of the United States-United 
Kingdom-Canada Security Conversations approved a draft paper 
including the following recommendation: 
"After obtaining the approval of all the Brussels signatories approaches 
would be made to the Scmzdinavian states to obtain their adherence to 
Brussels, the quid pro quo being the promise that the US would imme-
diately issue secwity guarantees to all Brussels signatories pending the 
conclusion of a wider Nonh Atlalltic Pact. (Action would go forward 
thereajier whether Sweden acquiesced or not.)" 
The Pact would comprise the US along with "all nations bordering 
the North Atlantic" including Iceland and Italy, with the exception 
of Spain.I78 The Policy Planning Staff had delivered a report on the 
previous day, recommending that the U.S. should press for "the 
immediate inclusion in Western Union of Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark and Iceland ... ". 179 Although these documents are far 
from being blue-prints of American policy, they would have been 
very illuminating, had they been known in Norden at the time -
which they were not. The vital information available at the time was 
derived from the conversations of Foreign Ministers at the Paris 
meeting. 
The Paris "summit" 
The conversations that took place in Paris were a by-product of the 
meeting on the Marshall Plan, with representatives of all sixteen 
"Marshall aid countries" present. Among the participants were the 
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Foreign Affairs Ministers of the United Kingdom, Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden. This provided a useful and non-ostensive 
opportunity for bilateral talks. 
As a matter of protocol, all attending Foreign Ministers paid 
formal visits to M. Bidault. In Lange's case, the conversation went 
far beyond protocol. Bidault told Lange that the Western Union 
pact, to be signed in Brussels immediately after the Paris meeting, 
contained a clause that allowed for additional members to join, 
assuming all mutual obligations, or only part of them. Lange 
warned against urging such matters, so as to avoid misgivings 
concerning economic eo operation in Europe.IBO Doubtlessly, he 
had his Scandinavian neighbors in mind. By this time, Sweden 
wholeheartedly supported the European recovery program, and 
with equal determination insisted that it be kept separate from any 
type of military assistance. The Danes felt the same way,l&I and 
Lange himself took care to distinguish between economic and 
military aspects of international eo operation.IB2 As the conversa-
tion turned to recent events in Finland, Bidault stated, rather 
abruptly, that to France, an attack on Norway would be a casus belli. 
Lange did not invite him to elaborate on that.IBJ 
The significant conversations took place between Bevin and 
Lunge, and Bevin and Rasmussen, on March 15 and 16 respectively. 
Bevin had been briefed by an aide-memoire from the Ministry of 
Defence. 1&4 The Chiefs of Staff stressed the importance of 
controlling the entrances to the Baltic, in case of war, and expressed 
their belief that in case of military conflict, Scandinavia would 
become "a main combat area". Norwegian ports were also 
important to Atlantic communications. Swedish industry and raw 
materials might be of importance. The aide-memoire went on to 
sketch possible scenarios and stated that the Chiefs of Staff were 
"prepared to share any information [they had] about this with the 
Norwegians".IB5 In Paris, Bevin did not discuss military aspects at 
all. On political and security problems he was both frank and 
explicit, and gave Lange the gist of his recent confidential exchange 
of opinions with Marshall, including the proposal for three related 
security systemsiB6 He also said that if the question of British 
assistance did arise, it would be necessary to know in advance what 
facilities would be available. 1B7 On the following day, Denmark's 
Rasmussen got the same information. Bevin also saw Unden for a 
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diplomatic tour d'horizon, where he warned against Soviet pressure. 
The three Scandinavian Foreign Ministers had met in Copenha-
gen on their way to Paris, and Lange had briefed them on his 
conversations on March 8. They also exchanged information after 
their talks with Bevin. 
Bevin's short but significant message influenced Scandinavian 
security policies in several ways. It transformed declarations of 
sympathy into practical arrangements for security; it dealt 
separately with Western European and Atlantic security problems; 
it forecast formal and close participation by the U.S. in an Atlantic 
system; it included Spitzbergen and therefore, by implication, all of 
Northern Norway and, last but not least, it took Norway's security 
problems straight up to government level. In the case of Denmark, it 
meant that the possibility of understanding on lower levels, without 
official political commitment, became a more remote possibility, 
and that more decisive steps might have to be taken. To Sweden it 
meant that a Scandinavian alliance must be proved to be more 
reliable than an Atlantic one, i.e. more likely to keep its members 
out of future conflicts. 
These options had been considered for some time already in 
leading Norwegian circles. 
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Three Norwegian leaders 
Defense Minister Hauge was primarily concerned about military 
supplies. He had long been aware that they could only be gained, in 
quantity, from the U.S. - hence his talks with the attaches in 
February. Lange's preoccupations were political, and traditions of 
long standing made him focus on the United Kingdom. One lasting 
effect of the March crisis was to bring it home to all Norwegian 
cabinet members that political and military aspects were definitely 
intertwined, and that, politically as well as militarily, the important 
decisions were now being made in America. 
However, while Hauge was convinced that openly organized co-
operation with the U.S. would provide the best solution to Norway's 
security problems, Lange had not entirely discarded his "third-
force" philosophy. Bay asked him quite frankly whether Norwegi-
ans, and more specifically those surrounding the government, 
thought about Western European co-operation as a possibility to 
create "a third bloc" confronting both the Soviet Union and the 
United States. Lunge replied that he did not think any responsible 
Norwegian could envisage a Western European co-operation as 
directed against the U.S.,"but I definitely thought that many Nor-
wegians, among them myself, looked at closer association in 
Western Europe as the only possibility to create new self-confidence 
in this part of the world, as well as ability and determination to 
manifest its own characteristics and its specific thinking with 
energy in international debate. To me, as a social-democrat, this 
point of view held particular importance. We share our views on 
democracy with the United States of America, but our ideas on how 
best to solve our economic problems were, as the Ambassador was 
aware, different from those that prevailed in the U.S.A." tss During 
the waiting period in April 1948, he may well have carried this 
trend of thought further, accepting a high degree of military co-
operation as an inevitable fact of political life, recognizing the 
omni-presence of America in security problems, and pared his third 
force leanings accordingly. At the end of the process, he was 
prepared to accept the United States, not only as a desirable support 
in critical situations, but as a pern1anent partner in a formal and 
open arrangement. This did not imply turning away from Nordic 
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co-operation. It only strengthened his conviction that Norway could 
not afford to shut herself off from the Western integration process 
that was rapidly gaining momentum. The administration of the 
European Recovery Program in Norway also seemed to prove that 
on principles of national economy, one could easily agree to 
disagree.IS'I In 1942, the Norwegian government in London sub-
mitted a resume of its main thinking to leaders of the underground 
Home Front, including a preview of post-war Atlantic co-operation. 
The answer, drafted by Lange, warned against abandoning 
traditional "Nordism ".1 911 April 1948, to him, was a definite turning 
point, after a maturing process that had begun in 194 7 and 
crystallized in December of that year, as revealed in his momentous 
conversation with McNeiJ.19J 
In Defense Minister Hauge's thinking there had been more 
continuity and less change. He took office in the fall of 1945 after 
years of leadership in military resistance. It fell upon him to rebuild 
Norwegian defense at a time when it was, in his own words "lying 
with a broken back" except for the army in exile. To him, 
Norwegian security policies were part and parcel of international 
relations generally. He was convinced that Norwegian rearmament 
should seek maximal benefit from the experiences of the Second 
World War and from the intimate relationship with the Allies. 
Starting from scratch made this even easier. He refused to be bound 
by traditional patterns and relics of pre-war organization. This 
attitude led to considerable turbulence within the military establish-
ment, which only strengthened Hauge's determination to pursue his 
goal and, not less important, to assure the supremacy of political 
authority over the military, which to him was a basic principle of 
democracy. A strong man, he did not flinch from controversy. He 
had a clear concept of co-operation with other nations. With her 
limited resources, Norway could not defend herself for long against 
attack from a superior power. His first outline for the rebuilding of 
defense contained a program matic statement: it must be the aim of 
Norwegian forces to hold its own "until we get efficient help from 
those who might become our allies". 192 The statement was delibe-
rately generaL The unspecified helper might be the contemplated 
armed force of the United Nations, a near neighbor, or some nation 
acting in its own interest, contingent upon circumstances. There can 
be little doubt, however, that Hauge, with his background from 
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Resistance, saw several closer possibilities. Now, when military 
preparedness again seemed urgently required, the question of the 
possible ally needs must arise with top priority. 
In the meantime, another principle had been added to his 
doctrine. A parliamentary commission on defensei93 found in early 
1947 that there was general approval of Hauge's guidelines. An 
inner circle of close advisers in the Defense Ministry spelled out the 
conclusions more clearly in September 194 7: In a worst-case 
scenario, the only efficient assistance could come from Western 
powers, and it could only be relied upon if it had been prepared in 
peacetime. Isolated Norwegian neutrality was unrealistic. Even a 
Swedish-Norwegian neutrality lacked credibility. The Scandinavian 
peninsula, however, remained one strategic area. Swedish attitude 
and Swedish military strength remained a factor of very con-
siderable significance to a common allied effort on Norwegian 
territory.I94 In April1948, Hauge's thinking was perfectly clear and 
well considered: a Western alliance was necessary; the strategic 
problem remained a Swedish-Norwegian one. 
Norwegian Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen had not, so far, 
played a prominent role in the handling of security problems. He 
signed Haakon Lie's resolution in favor of the Bevin plan,I95 but was 
probably more attracted by its economic and "third force" aspects 
than by its implicit vista. In January 1949 he was to say the decisive 
word, and unite the Labour Party which had been split almost down 
the middle. Until then, for over a year, he had not committed 
himself. He was, however, extremely reluctant to accept any major 
disagreement with the Swedes. 
At this juncture, all important elements in the coming debates had 
been introduced. The Western powers had emphatically expressed 
their interest in the Norwegian appeal. With equal clarity, Sweden 
had set forth her apprehensions. No more clarification could be 
expected from the Western powers until they had worked out more 
precise plans and examined the possible role and importance of 
Scandinavia in that frame of reference. In the meantime, an attempt 
must be made to maintain Scandinavian unity or, at a minimum, to 
prevent an open split. 
Swedish Foreign Minister U nden was determined to make an 
effort in that direction. For this purpose, he came, unofficially and 
secretly, to Oslo on the third of May, 1948. 
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The Swedish initiative 
and the summer of non-events 
Swedish Foreign Minister Unden came to Oslo, privately and 
unofficially, on May 3rd 1948, to seek a platform for resumption of 
negotiations on a Scandinavian defense union. His errand had been 
discussed on the highest level in Stockholm.I96 He met Prime 
Minister Gerhardsen, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lange, and 
Defense Minister Hauge in open, free and confidential conversation. 
This was the time for a full exchange of opinions. All of them were 
in favor of a Scandinavian union. Hauge and Lange held that such 
an arrangement would not be credible without some form of 
established opening toward the West. Unden was of the opinion that 
such arrangements, if made in peace-time, would represent 
increased danger of war rather than protection against it. Gerhard-
sen had not committed himself. The consolidated Norwegian point 
of view was that a full examination should be made, keeping all 
options open. The general Swedish attitude was that unconditional 
nonalignment should be presupposed. At the end of the day, the 
Norwegians felt that their reasoning had been understood, and that 
there was a distinct possibility of inquiry without preconditions. 
Subsequent discussions revealed that no common platform could be 
found for such procedure. The Swedish government remained 
convinced that a Scandinavian defense union must be based on the 
principle of Swedish neutrality. The summer of 1948 became a 
period of non-events. The Western powers were still moving toward 
more precise conceptions; the U.S. continued the time-consuming 
procedures of democratic decision-making; a triangle of British-
Swedish-Norwegian misunderstandings led to diplomatic frictions. 
As far as Scandinavian security problems are concerned, no major 
event occurred until September 1948. After an exchange of letters 
between Unden and Lange, a meeting of Nordic Foreign Ministers 
announced, on September 9, that an inter-Nordic study would now 
be made. The communique stated that " ... a certain difference 
prevails in the attitude toward problems of security policy ... ". 
However, the Foreign Ministers had found that there was a basis for 
a common study. The Scandinavian Committee on Defense ("Den 
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skandinaviske forsvarskomite") convened on October 16. In the 
meantime, Denmark and Norway had received the first substantial 
information on plans for what was to become the North Atlantic 
Pact. More complete insight was to be expected at the end of the 
year, on both alternatives. At that moment a decisive choice would 
have to be made.I97 
Between September 1948 and February 1949 two attempts were 
made to find a way of associating Sweden with the North Atlantic 
Pact with limited commitments, through a system of overlapping 
alliances. Both efforts were British, and both were the personal 
endeavors of Robert Hankey.I98 
Hankey and the interlocldng pacts 
In the first half of October 1948, Hankey suggested a possible way 
of indirect affiliation for Sweden. The basic idea was to envisage 
two separate pacts, one Nordic, one North Atlantic. Denmark and 
Norway would be members of both pacts, Sweden only of the 
Nordic one. This system of interlocking pacts would preserve 
Scandinavian unity, and also imply certain Swedish commitments 
toward her two neighbors, in other words, toward members of 
NATO. The scope and extent of these commitments would be the 
crucial point. 
The idea originated with the British Ambassadors in Copenha-
gen, Oslo and Stockholm. They had jointly recommended that the 
British policy should aim at drawing Denmark and Norway into an 
Atlantic Pact and thereafter "try to attach Sweden to Norway and 
Denmark".I99 Hankey was strongly attracted by the suggestion, and 
worked out an outline of possible mutual obligations. 
Norway and Denmark should enter the North Atlantic Pact as 
full members "or if necessary as members with a more limited 
commitment of mutual assistance". Under the Scandinavian Pact, 
Sweden would remain "non be/ligere/11 (not neutral)" even if 
Denmark and Norway were drawn in by their obligations under an 
Atlantic treaty. Only if the neighbors were "actively attacked" 
would Sweden be under an obligation to "enter the war with all her 
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force" and only in this case would Sweden "be entitled to assistance 
from Great Britain, United States of America and other Western 
Powers."200 Sweden would be entitled to the assistance of Norway 
and Denmark if attacked, and this "would involve the other 
members of the North Atlantic security pact".'O' 
It seems utterly unlikely that Hankey's outline could be 
acceptable to Sweden, if taken at face value. The mere reference to 
Sweden as "non-belligerent, (not neutral)" would immediately meet 
with disapproval. The term "non-belligerent" was adopted, in its 
time, to describe political alignments or affinities that went way 
beyond the outer limits of neutrality, but stopped short of war. In 
current usage of the 1940's it frequently referred to Spain's attitude 
toward The Third Reich, and Franco's toward Hitler, during the 
Second World War. Two other points, however, call for elucidation. 
First, Hankey included the possibility of Danish and Norwegian 
membership with limited commitments. In this case, if commit-
ments were narrowly limited, could they reduce obligations outside 
Scandinavia to a point that would be acceptable to Sweden, so that a 
Scandinavian pact, even if interlocked with the North Atlantic one, 
did not compromise Swedish neutrality?, and could commitment of 
mutual assistance be limited so severely that it might even seem 
attractive to the Swedes? 
During the summer of 1948 the notion of limited commitment 
was used repeatedly by military and political planners working on 
the strategic concept and outline plan for the future NATO. For the 
purposes of this paper, suffice it to quote the interpretation offered 
by participants in the exploratory security conversations in 
Washington:202 " ... these countries would agree to defend their own 
territories to the limit of their capabilities and to make available 
such facilities as are within their power, whenever required, in order 
to provide for the protection of the North Atlantic Area".20J There 
was no need to admonish Sweden to defend herself to the utmost of 
her capacity. Making facilities available to Western powers was an 
entirely different matter, especially when such facilities should be 
made available "whenever requested". This phrasing came very 
close to the Norwegian principle that assistance in war should be 
prepared in peace-time,1(H which the Swedes consistently refused to 
accept. According to the Swedish view, prepared facilities, for 
instance in Swedish airfields, might have disastrous consequen-
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ces.205 ln addition, the purpose of the whole facilities arrangement 
was "to provide for the protection of the North Atlantic area". 
Acceptance of this kind of obligations presupposed a revision of 
Swedish fundamentals, and was, in fact, unimaginable. 
In the second place, the implications of Swedish non-belligerency 
were expounded by Hankey in such a way as to remove any possible 
indistinctness. lf Denmark and Norway were "engaged" in war, but 
"not actively attacked" Sweden would 
"prepare by mobilization if necessmy to defend her territol}' including her 
air space against any Sovie(206 attempt to cross or ust~ either for any 
pUI]>Ose civil or militmy. She would allow Sovietmercha/11 vessels but not 
war.ships to use her tenitoriall1!aters and would actively prevent the laying 
of Soviet mines. She would so dt:rpose ufher radar sen1ices to give wanling 
to the Danish and Nonvegian sen1ice authmities of any impending alfack 
upon them. She would co-operate so far as she could in measures of 
economic wmfare against Russia, and would resist any attempt to prt~vent 
or dissuade her from trading with the Western Powers (iron ore, ball-
bearings, timber, munition~~ ... "207 
These obligations run counter to some of the basic aims of Swedish 
neutrality policy. They call for deliberate trade discrimination; 
direct participation in economic warfare; and systematic deviation 
from principles of international law as regards droit de passage in 
neutral sea territory. With more forthrightness than art they actually 
list some major bones of contention that had seriously embittered 
British-Swedish relations during the Second World War.ln addition, 
they refer throughout to the Soviet Union as the only possible 
aggressor, whereas the oflicial Swedish position was to shoot at 
whoever violated Swedish neutrality.2o8 
However, Hankey sent his memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff-
who approved - and thereafter to the British Embassy in 
Washington for communication to the State Department.109 He also 
suggested that it might be circulated to the Permanent Commission 
of the Brussels Powers. He took care to point out that Danes and 
Norwegians wished to conclude the Scandinavian discussions 
before facing the wider question of their association with an 
Atlantic union. For this reason, the timing and presentation of any 
proposal along these lines required separate consideration.2IO 
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Apparently he changed his mind as to timing, or perhaps he 
embarked on an indirect approach. He disclosed his trend of 
thought to the Norwegian Ambassador in London, Mr. Prebensen, 
in two conversations.211 Prebensen felt that the idea deserved to be 
considered. Hankey authorized him to submit it to Lange, as "top 
secret" information.212 
The Hankey plan was given most serious consideration in Oslo. 
On October 19, Lunge instructed Prebensen to advise against it. The 
instruction was strongly worded: the suggestion was seen as "very 
dangerous". Prebensen should immediately express a wish for 
dropping the proposal and not making it known. In agreement with 
Gerhardsen and Hauge, Lange gave two reasons for his decision. If 
the Hankey plan became a matter of public discussion in Norway, it 
would lead to considerable domestic problems and might even 
threaten the position of the Government. Equally important, the 
plan was counter-productive. It would not attract Sweden. On the 
contrary, it would strengthen the argument for absolute neutrality, 
and be interpreted as a sign that Sweden might receive Western 
guarantees without accepting significant obligations in return. At 
this point, Lange was not acquainted with the full definition of non-
belligerency in Hankey's memorandum. Prebensen's report had 
only referred summarily to "certain services" which Sweden would 
have to render. With fuller information, Lange would no doubt have 
felt even more convinced that Sweden could do nothing but turn 
down the Hankey plan. Prebensen immediately notitied Hankey, 
who said that he would be guided by Lange. 
Lange s alternative 
Lange was very much aware of Sweden's military and economic 
strength. He also shared the feeling of belonging together which is a 
permanent factor in Scandinavian politics, and in public opinion. 
During the German occupation of Norway, the Norwegian 
Government in London set out its guidelines for future foreign 
policy, and stressed the importance of Atlantic and Western 
solidarity. It fell to Lange to comment upon the statement, on behalf 
of Norwegian Resistance. In spite of strained Norwegian-Swedish 
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relations at the time, he warned strongly against giving second 
priority to Nordic solidarity. In 1948, he felt very strongly that 
Norway needed support from her Eastern neighbor as well as from 
the West. He felt equally strongly that if Sweden remained adamant 
on the principle of non alignment and rigorously refused even 
tenuous ties with the West, Norway could not hope to have the best 
of both worlds. He had made up his mind that if the moment came 
when a definitive choice could no longer be avoided, Norway must 
choose the West. In the meantime, he was looking for possible ways 
to bring the Nordic and North Atlantic alternatives together. He was 
firmly convinced that the Hankey plan could not serve this purpose. 
Lange had a plan of his own, that might just barely bring Swedish, 
Norwegian, Danish and Western interests under a common 
denominator. 
The negotiations had reached a stage where strategic considera-
tions, defense and deterrence, played a predominant role. From this 
point of view, the crucial problem was the entrance to the Baltic, 
through the narrow passages of Skagerrak and Kattegat, bordering 
all three countries and of vital interest to Western naval strategy. If 
Sweden could accept some kind of common arrangement for the 
closing of these narrows in war-time, it might prove satisfactory to 
all parties concerned. On the same day as Lange spoke strongly 
against the Hankey plan, he set forth his alternative in a conver-
sation with the British Ambassador. There was a chance, he said, 
that Sweden might be induced to assume jointly with Norway and 
Denmark the responsibility for "sealing off the Baltic" and to accept 
a guarantee from the United States. He had discussed this possibility 
with Mr. Marshall and had gathered that as a last resort this solution 
would be acceptable to the United States." 13 
Lange's alternative should be seen against the background of 
general trends of thought at the time. In the first place, Lunge's 
position was strengthened through the Norwegian cabinet's 
unanimous agreement on aims and purposes of the negotiations. In 
a special session on October 18, i.e. immediately before Lange 
turned down the Hankey plan, the following guideline was adopted: 
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" ... that the solllfion of the problem that should be sought also from the 
Nonvegian side, was a Nordic defense alliance under the ntles set out in 
articles 51 and 52-54 in the C/wner of the United Nations, with a 
guaralllee from the \Vest ern Power;; !Jut wilholll automatic obligations of 
alliance toward the West. It lies within the limits of the possible to get such 
a concept accepted by the Swede;; and it must be a task for us to try to 
have it accepted also by Great Britain and by the United States. 
Only if it turns out to be absolutely ilnpossible to obtain a guarantee 
}i"om the \Vest on this basi;; can the problem arise whether one should go 
further jimn the Nonl'egian side, and accept direct mull/a/ obligations 
within a North Atlamic Regional Pact. Howel'er, eJ'Cl)'lhing poims in the 
direction that this would mean alienation from Sweden, and therefore it 
would be vel)' difficult to unite the total non-commw1ist p<u·t of the 
Nonvegian population around it':21.J -
On the Western side, opinions on Sweden were clearly divided at the 
time. The British were very much aware of Sweden us an asset, and 
were willing to offer special inducements. However, it was 
undesirable that Unden should feel assured of British approval for a 
continued policy of neutrality in all circumstances.215 In the U.S. 
Sweden was frequently seen as a deliberate sideliner who did not 
really deserve support unless she accepted commitments to the 
common cause. A National Security Council study on Scandinavia 
dated September 3 1948 stated with respect to Sweden that the U.S. 
should "make perfectly clear to Sweden our dissatisfaction with its 
apparent failure to discriminate ... between the West and the Soviet 
Union" and that Swedish requirements for military equipment 
should be considered only after those of countries which have given 
indication of intention to cooperate with the US or Rrussels 
signatories in security arrangements."216 
The brunt of the argument, however, was directed against Great 
Britain. British aviation industry had accepted orders to manufac-
ture modern fighter planes, Spitfires and Vampires, for Sweden. In a 
hand-written postscript, Hickerson waxed indignant: "Why the hell 
should we spend money to rearm the Brussels Pact countries when 
they are selling jets to neutrals?"217 The State Department conveyed 
its disapproval in an aide-memoire to British Ambassador Oliver 
Franks, September 24.218 The stage seemed set for a confrontation 
of incompatible policies, the American stick versus the British 
carrot. At this juncture, Secretary Marshall intervened. He 
disapproved of what seemed to him to be unnecessarily strong 
language in conversations with the Swedes. He issued instructions to 
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lay off outspoken pressure tactics with Sweden.219 Obviously, 
Marshal! expected more from a patient approach to Sweden, over 
time. One reason for this may be found in his conversation with 
Lunge, September 29. Marshal! spent more than two hours with his 
Norwegian opposite number and "was impressed by the frankness 
and sincerity of his presentation".220 Lange expanded on the 
guidelines that had been set down in a memorandum signed by 
Prime Minister Gerhardsen after deliberations in the Norwegian 
cabinet, September 2 7 and took particular care to explain why a 
Scandinavian union must have top priority. This would not be 
strong enough, but it would be an essential advantage, from any 
point of view, if the three Nordic neighbors could stand together. 
From the Norwegian side it was clear that such a Nordic union must 
in some form or other have ties to a regional North Atlantic co-
operation. Sweden was the only Nordic country with a strong 
defense, and also had a much broader industrial infrastructure. In 
addition, public opinion in Norway would find it very difficult to 
accept Norwegian association with a regional system outside 
Norden, unless Sweden and Denmark did the same. Marshal! asked 
whether the Swedes could have agreed to Scandinavian negotiations 
with the purpose of convincing Denmark and Norway that they 
should adopt the Swedish/Swiss conception of neutrality. Lange 
said this was a strong trend of thought in Sweden. However, he 
again stressed the importance of, if possible, bringing Sweden into a 
"Collaboration on defense" ("forsvarssamarbeid") without any 
clause of absolute neutrality. Under no circumstance could Norway 
defend both her coastline and her eastern frontier, so a neutral and 
friendly Sweden would also be of fundamental importance. At this 
point, the conversation took an interesting turn. Marshal! said he 
was aware of Norway's difficult geographic position, and the 
disproportion between territory and population. He felt, however, 
that the South-West coast of Norway was of such fundamental 
strategic interest to the Soviet Union that in case of war, the Soviets 
would make considerable efforts to control it, regardless of whether 
Norway had Western commitments or not. Lange's memo on the 
conversation continues: "I said that I, personally, entirely agreed 
with this reasoning, but that it would be of great importance to 
public opinion in Norway if we had reasonable assurance of prompt 
assistance to hold the South-West coast; and we would consider it 
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an essential gain if we could have Sweden participate in the defense 
of this area. Mr. Marshall asked, somewhat wanderingly ("noe 
undrende") whether I really believed we could get Sweden to accept 
such obligations. If the three Nordic countries were to commit 
themselves to preventing that the Soviets secured a foothold on the 
Norwegian South-West coast, a regional Nordic union could have 
real importance. I replied that this was what we now would like to 
ascertain, but to find out, we needed time."22J 
Without jumping to conclusions, it may be worth noting that in 
Marshall's own memo on the same conversation, this particular 
point is toned down to almost nothing.m In a supplement,223 
however, he mentioned vaguely "a reference by Foreign Minister 
Lange to the possibility that something short of complete 
participation in a North Atlantic arrangement might be the best 
plan for Norway." It seems entirely possible that he did not want the 
idea publicized until Lange had explored possibilities in complete 
secrecy. There is weighty evidence to the effect that Marshal! took 
the idea seriously. On October 4 he told Bevin "that in his view the 
critical point was the strait between Denmark and Sweden: if that 
could be made impassable in time of war then a Scandinavian bloc 
might not be too bad ... "224 
Lange continued to mention the idea,225 although he may not 
have been too optimistic about it. In the meeting of British 
Ambassadors to Scandinavia October 22, Mr. Collier stated that 
Lange "might still conceivably be hoping to bring the Swedes into 
some sort of general association with an Atlantic security pact."226 
Hankey was not convinced that the Nordic states were able to 
seal off the Baltic, even if they wanted to. "I don't see them doing it 
myself without considerable armed assistance from the West".227 
Marshal! may have been left with little hope after his meeting 
with Unden in Paris, October 14. The conversation developed into 
two monologues running parallel, with both participants explaining 
their own policy and being unable to harmonize them. Rumors had 
it that there was, at times, an undertone that bordered on bitterness. 
Marshall himself conveyed a hint in that direction, by ending his 
memorandum on the conversation as follows: "Towards the end of 
our conversation, Foreign minister Unden made the comment that 
the problem of Swedish neutrality was his problem. I agreed that it 
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was, but indicated that as he had spoken frankly to me, I wanted to 
give him my frank views on the question" .22" 
However, Lange did not give up all hope. Talking to Mr. Jebb 229 
in Paris, on November 20, 1948, he still did not discard the idea of a 
Scandinavian bloc "sealing the Baltic". Jebb had the impression, 
however, that it must be a very remote possibility. It was "just 
possible ... that if sufficient pressure were put on the Swedes, and 
notably if the Americans made it clear that a policy of complete 
neutrality would result in no American arms, the Swedes would 
agree to the Three Power defensive alliance embodying some 
provisions designed to deny the entrances to the Baltic to both sides 
in the event of war in which the Scandinavian bloc would not be 
involved."230 In this version it is made explicitly clear that the 
"scaling" must work both ways. No other obligations would seem 
likely to win Swedish approval. Such a stipulation would of course 
make the whole arrangement less palatable to the Western Powers. 
It is clear from Lange's notes that it was Jebb who brought up the 
problem by asking whether the Swedes would "at a minim urn 
accept mutual responsibility to keep the Belts closed and South-
West Norway free?" Lange replied that "this we did not yet know, 
but we would of course try to find out." No doubt he wanted to wait 
for the findings of the Scandinavian Committee on Defense that 
was now in session. No doubt, he also realized that Unden, at least, 
would never give his consent. In a long conversation, before Lange 
met Marshall, the Swedish Foreign Minister had made it quite clear 
that there was considerable doubt in Sweden about joining a 
Scandinavian alliance at all, regardless of conditions, since 
Denmark and Norway were militarily weak. Unden was convinced 
that a Scandinavian defense union, based on Swedish principles, 
could be assured of Western support without commitments and 
preparations in peacetime, and that military assistance would be 
forthcoming, once the union had been established. 
In Lange's view, two main problems now remained. Would the 
Western Powers feel that a system of "all out commitment on joint 
Scandinavian defense obligations" without formal ties to a North 
Atlantic alliance, could serve a purpose by itself? And in this case, 
would Norway receive military assistance on a lend-lease basis? 
These were the two questions that Lange posed to Marshall on 
November 20.231 The "sealing off' of the Baltic was no longer a 
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practical proposition. Lunge's alternative to Hankey had proved no 
more acceptable to Sweden than the Hankey plan itself. 
This could hardly have been entirely unexpected, at least as far as 
Unden's personal opinions were concerned. Why, then, did Lange 
keep the suggestion alive for so many weeks? Many explanations 
might be offered. 
Defense Minister Hauge was reportedly slightly more optimistic 
about Sweden than Lange was. He knew that many leading Swedish 
officers were aware that even Sweden needed considerable 
assistance from abroad, such as airplanes, radar, arms and other 
equipment.232 He saw the military necessity of relying on the 
nearest strong power. The Western Powers were far away and had, 
so far, little to offer. Their contribution to Norwegian security, apart 
from the general deterrence factor, would be to provide modern 
armament at moderate cost, when their production got going again. 
Hauge also had reason to doubt whether the U.S. seriously wanted 
Norway to join the North Atlantic system in the immediate future. 
In April 1948, American General Wedemeyer, Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Plans and Operations, advised Dag Bryn to keep Norway 
neutral until the U. S. was strong enough233_ William Donovan, the 
former OSS chief, told Hauge in Oslo, October 16, 1948, that the 
U.S. would welcome with satisfaction a "pure and simple 
Scandinavian regional defense pact". Hauge took this seriously 
enough to discuss it with near advisers as well as with Lange.234 
Both of them knew that these attitudes did not coincide with 
political thinking in Foreign Office and State Department. However, 
as long as security systems were still under discussion, they could 
not afford to neglect any information from knowledgeable sources. 
It is easily understandable if military information was more readily 
available to Hauge, and political thinking to Lange. Wedemeyer's 
statement, for instance, may well have reflected general views in the 
American military establishment at the time.m Lange had more 
immediate experience of Unden's adamant attitude, as well as of 
Western desires to bring Norway into the Atlantic alliance. There 
are also indications that Bevin was inclined to expect more from 
Sweden than his officials did, with the possible exception of 
Hankey.236 
But both Hauge's and Lange's personal impressions and inter-
pretations were secondary to the established policy of the 
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Norwegian cabinet, where the stature and the firm hand of Prime 
Minister Gerhardsen dominated, and where the Norwegian 
priorities had been repeatedly set out and unanimously approved. 
The obvious first choice must be a Scandinavian agreement on 
security policies. Everything must be tried to reach this solution, as 
long as it did not preclude ties to a major system within the United 
Nations.237 The same general attitude was expressed in a cabinet 
meeting October 18, 1948. Norway should aim at a Nordic defense 
union under the rules set in articles 51 and 52-54 in the Charter of 
the United Nation "with guarantee from the Western Powers but 
without automatic obligations of Western alliance". Only if a 
western guarantee turned out to be absolutely unobtainable on this 
basis, could other solutions be considered.238 
Finally, and decisively: Lange and Hauge shared the conviction 
that close cooperation with Sweden was essential, for material 
reasons; as a natural and traditional tenet of Scandinavian policy; 
and with regard to public opinion and solid national unity of 
purpose in such vital matters. Neither hesitated to make this 
perfectly clear to western diplomats. Counselor Villard of the 
American Embassy in Oslo received the impression that Lange had 
"definite mental reservations about unilateral adherence to North 
Atlantic security pact" pending the outcome of the Scandinavian 
discussions, and that he would "maintain this cautious attitude until 
all possibilities have been explored with Sweden".239 On the 
following day, Villard reported a conversation with Hauge, who 
stated that "Norway must explore every possibility [of] reaching 
agreement with [he] Swedes before taking action to join any 
western security pact.240 
Lange's alternative to Hankey was introduced because Lange felt 
that it had at least a possibility of succeeding. Also, he felt that once 
Sweden had taken this first step, it would ultimately, sooner or later, 
lead to Swedish acceptance of closer links with the West. Thus, in 
due time, a Scandinavian defense union would develop more 
substantial ties with an Atlantic system. If this perspective remained 
open, Lange would have accepted a regional Scandinavian 
alliance.241 
After the attempt had failed, the final outcome seemed to hinge 
upon the findings of the Scandinavian Committee on Defense, and 
on more complete information regarding the scope and purpose of 
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the North Atlantic Treaty. Comprehensive reports on both were 
available in December 1948. At this point, Hankey renewed his 
efforts and submitted the second version of his plan. 
The Second Hankey Plan 
The Committee on Scandinavian Defense did not formally deliver 
its report until January 15, 1949. Its conclusions, however, were 
clear at its third meeting, December 14-19, 1948, and known to the 
three governments. The report is still classified, but important parts, 
including the general conclusion, have been quoted in the Nordic 
parliaments and other contexts242 The committee emphasized that a 
Scandinavian defense union was likely to be a factor in preventing 
attack but would not in itself be sufficient to prevent a strategic 
assault; that the necessary Danish and Norwegian rearmament 
depended to a considerable extent on supplies from abroad; that the 
two nations could only afford this if material became available on 
lenient financial terms; that, in case of an attack, armed assistance 
would be needed already in the opening phase; and that, if no 
preparations had been made in peace-time, extensive assistance 
could not be expected for several months. 
So far the conclusion was unanimous. After this, the commission 
split. The Danish and Norwegian members added a statement to the 
effect that an agreement on defense union must not exclude 
Scandinavia from receiving assistance "prepared in peace-time". 
The Swedish members stated that, for the time being, it must be 
assumed that necessary supplies for Danish and Norwegian 
rearmament would be available. A union determined to seriously 
improve its forces by resources of its own, might stimulate material 
assistance from outside. It is widely felt that the Swedish military 
members of the commission, at this point, felt bound by their 
democratic loyalty toward political authority.243 When the conclu-
sions of the report were known, Norway urgently requested as 
complete information as could be given at the time on progress in 
drafting the charter of the North Atlantic Alliance. Replies from 
London and Washington were received on New Years eve, 1948. A 
few days later, the Prime Ministers, Foreign Affairs and Defense 
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Ministers of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, met privately and 
secretly in Karlstad, Sweden, with access to the fullest information 
that had so far been available. At this meeting, Sweden gave a 
considerable concession to the neighbor states, and offered to join 
an alliance with them immediately, regardless of their military 
deficiencies. In more colloquial terms, Sweden was prepared to 
shoulder the burden of Scandinavian defense almost alone for a 
couple of years to come. Even with considerable efforts, Danish and 
Norwegian defense could not be expected to reach a state of 
relevant credibility until after 1955. Under these circumstances it 
was a foregone conclusion that Denmark could only hope for 
limited assistance, to prevent immediate occupation; also, Sweden 
could not be expected to defend all of Northern Norway. The offer 
would not be valid if Denmark and Norway had an attachment to 
the West. 
When the ministers left from Karlstad, nothing had been decided. 
Gerhardsen was weighing the pros and cons in the new situation. 
Lange and Hauge felt that real possibilities had been exhausted, 
there was no hope left that Sweden could accept any form of 
opening toward the West. They went for a "walk in the woods" or 
more precisely, along the canals of Karlstad, and decided to take the 
problem home with them, and consult with advisers. At this point, 
Hankey decided to try his hand again. 
Three alternatives 
In Washington there was a strong feeling that under no circum-
stances would Sweden move away from absolute formal non-
alignment. Therefore, it should be made perfectly clear that any 
Swedish wishes for military supplies would only be added to the 
waiting list of nations with low priority. 244 Hankey was, of course, 
fully aware of this. A report from Washington on December 18 was 
very clear: The State Department "feels strongly that we might as 
well rule Sweden out as a participant here and now."245 At this 
juncture, the Foreign Office was also guided by a formal cabinet 
decision to the effect that Norway and Denmark should be included 
if possible, but that any country which hesitated or caused delay 
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should be immediately discarded.246 The general trend of thought 
was that if the Swedes were left in isolation, reflection would move 
them to attach themselves in some way at a later date to the other 
Scandinavian countries who would be better partners when they 
were strengthened and backed up by their membership in the 
Atlantic Pact.24 7 
Given all this, it may seem surprising that Hankey again tried to 
find a compromise acceptable to Sweden. That is what he did, 
however, in a memorandum dated January 17, 1949. 
Hankey recommended "a joint Anglo-American proposal to all 
three Scandinavian Powers that Norway and Denmark should be 
enabled to adhere to the Scandinavian Pact as well as to the Atlantic 
Pact, arrangements being made to ensure that Sweden would not 
thereby be involved in war unless Norway or Denmark were 
physically attacked." There were, at the time, three possible courses 
to pursue: a) stick to the policy that had been agreed upon in 
Washington before Christmas, ignore Sweden and invite Denmark 
and Norway in; b) a new version of the first Hankey plan, with 
interlocking Atlantic and Scandinavian pacts, but only Denmark 
and Norway as members of both; c) a Scandinavian Pact only, but 
with special Danish and Norwegian concessions to the West, in the 
form of bases in the Faeroes, special arrangements for defense of 
the Norwegian coastline, and staff talks where Denmark and Nor-
way would "make provisional plans with the British and American 
Staffs so that they could receive assistance if ever it was asked for; 
and in return the Scandinavian Powers would be supplied with 
arms, equipment and technical advice ... ". Hankey greatly preferred 
alternative no. 2, the interlocking pacts, and wanted it submitted to 
Washington at once, before a final Scandinavian decision.248 Jebb 
was rather doubtful, and preferred alternative c), mainly because he 
felt that the interlocking pacts solution would be difficult to put 
across.249 Plan c), however, was soon discarded. ISO In Oslo, British 
Ambassador Collier spoke clearly against any attempt to approach 
Sweden at this late stage, it could only lead Denmark and Norway 
away from the Western Powers. He did not offer any opinion on 
what the Swedish reaction might be, if they were asked to join an 
alliance which had binding obligations toward powers outside the 
alliance. Hankey was impressed by Collier's reasoning, but still felt 
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that one should try, at least, to get the Scandinavians to accept a 
system of interlocking pacts "if we possibly can".251 
Hankey's second effort ended as abruptly as it had begun. Its 
epitaph can be read in Collier's telegram from Oslo, January 27, 
1949: "Interlocking pacts now academic since Swedes will not 
agree"_252 It remains to be discussed what made Hankey try so hard 
at all. 
Officers and politicians in Sweden 
It was well known in London that many Swedish officers were 
worried about how to maintain the high standards of Swedish 
defense, if they were excluded from American priority lists. In the 
joint conclusions of the Scandinavian Committee on Defense. they 
shared the opinion of their Danish and Norwegian colleagues, that 
supplies from the West, i.e. from the U.S., were vital to Scandinavian 
defense as a whole. Politically, they were bound by the declared 
intention of the Swedish Government to stay out of any, even 
indirect, association with a North Atlantic alliance. They continued 
to promote the idea of a compromise. 
As the moment of decision drew near, they intensified their 
activities. In a lengthy conversation with the British Naval Attache 
to Stockholm, Commodore Tham253 adopted the very word 
"compromise" and suggested what seemed to him a satisfactory 
proposal. A "pre-war Western alliance" was from the general 
Swedish point of view unnecessary and undesirable. The compro-
mise would aim at an assurance of Western military fighting aid for 
Scandinavia, if the Nordic states, united in a Scandinavian pact, 
were involved in war. According to the British report, Tham spoke 
"with obvious anxiety and a desire to accommodate or perhaps to 
placate the West as far as possible". He also criticized Americans 
for pressing forward, instead of waiting for the findings of the 
Scandinavian committee "to convince the Swedish politicians of the 
need for Scandinavian unity, with perhaps Western backing". Using 
quotation marks, the report went on: "He said: 'This U.S. pressure 
now is distracting our politicians from the first requirement which is 
Scandinavian unity and if we are not careful these politicians will 
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retreat into their shells of obstinate, ignorant, unreasoning 
isolationism which will wreck all hopes of Scandinavian unity and 
thus of eventual possible Scandinavian alliance with the West."' 
From the context, it seems clear that the "U.S.pressure" mainly 
referred to the warnings that Sweden could not expect high priority 
for Western supply of arms unless in association with the Atlantic 
alliance. In his conclusion, the attache described Tham as "typical 
of the Defence Staff'.254 
Three points in this report deserve special attention. Where Tham 
referred to Western aid "if and when, and not before, Scandinavia is 
involved in war ... " Hankey added in the margin "No. Must be 
plans"; where Tham said "We must find a compromise" Hankey 
added "Yes"; and when at one point Tham suggested that Sweden 
might even guarantee "to come to the immediate support of 
Norway no matter how she was attacked, even if it was a seaborne 
assault on Narvik" he foreshadowed the admittedly less specific 
Swedish offer in Karlstad a month later, to assume the burdens of a 
Scandinavian alliance immediately, without waiting for Danish and 
Norwegian rearmament. 
General Nordenskiii]d255 was as outspoken, if not more. In a 
private conversation he said that "all top Swedish officers in all 
three branches of the Service "are now of one mind, namely, that 
Sweden must associate itself in some form with the West." The 
great problem was to convince the Defense Minister Vougt and 
Foreign Minister Unden. The General would like to continue the 
talk in near future "about the possibility of finding a 'formula' to fit 
the situation."256 
The British Ambassador Farquhar commented that Tham "seems 
to regard his politicians like the proverbial mule or donkey, and 
thinks that they can only be made to move by the 'carrot' 
technique".257 The Ambassador himself felt that besides this, "an 
occasional wallop on the backside sometimes has a salutary effect". 
Hankey, in one of his marginal notes, found that particular passage 
very interesting.258 
As late as January 3, !949, Hankey still shared the general British 
and American view at the time, that it seemed better to leave the 
Swedes out of the picture for the moment, and hope that they would 
dislike their isolation and ultimately try to find some way of 
adhering directly or indirectly to the North Atlantic Pact. This was 
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the policy that Bevin had approved "and which we propose to 
follow in the immediate future".259 Soon after that, something must 
have encouraged him to try again. This something seems to be fresh 
information that Swedish military chiefs intended to approach the 
political leadership in serious terms. 
On January I 0, 1949, the Chief of Staff of the Swedish Air Force 
infonned the British Air Attache that the Air Staff saw Sweden 
standing isolated. He assumed that the promised supply of aircraft 
from Great Britain would cease. He added "that the three Com-
manders-in-Chief of the Swedish armed forces were all equally 
alarmed and had persuaded Commander-in-Chief Jung to make 
urgent representations to the Swedish Cabinet, and to point out that 
a policy of isolation may jeopardize the rearming and moderniza-
tion of the Swedish armed forces. "260 Hankey already knew that the 
Swedish Defense Staff and the British Foreign Office were thinking 
along converging lines, hoping for a compromise that left the door 
open for more immediate association at a later stage. Now he 
learned that a unanimous military leadership was to take a serious 
initiative in the same direction, on the highest level possible in 
Sweden. This must be the time when he felt that a suggestion of 
compromise from the western side might still serve a purpose. On 
the following day he told the Swedish Ambassador that the Swedes 
should use "a little ingenuity to see if they could not devise a system 
by which Sweden would only be directly involved if Norway and 
Denmark were physically attacked" and that he felt sure "that we 
did not want to slam any doors and would be quite willing to discuss 
these problems amiably" 2 61 On the next day again, he drafted the 
first sketch of the second Hankey plan, which he submitted in more 
elaborate form on the 17th -and which was deemed "academic" on 
the 27th. 
The memorandum of the Swedish Chiefs of Staff was handed 
over to Defense Minister Vougt by General Jung on January 21, 
1949. The story of how it also became known to the British, very 
quickly and in utmost secrecy, does not belong here.262 
At the Nordic meeting of parliamentarians and advisers in 
Copenhagen January 22-24, the negotiations broke down irrepara-
bly. A new meeting in Oslo at the end of the month was only a 
matter of protocol. Norway joined NATO, Denmark followed 
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Norway, and Sweden stayed outside. The Nordic council was 
created to preserve and continue the tradition of unity. The story of 
how, and to what extent, permanent factors of geography, 
inclinations and necessities, continued to influence security policies 
and strategic analysis in the Nordic Region, remains to be written. 
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